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Abstract
This paper tests the impact of ﬁrms’ ownership structure on ﬁrms’ innovation decisions
using a rich dataset of roughly 20,000 Italian manufacturers. We ﬁnd that ownership con-
centration negatively aﬀects the probability of innovation, especially by reducing ﬁrms’
R&D eﬀort. The results also suggest that risk aversion induced by lack of ﬁnancial or
industrial diversiﬁcation is a source of large shareholders’ reluctance to innovate. More-
over, conﬂicts of interest between large and minority shareholders appear to reinforce the
negative eﬀect of ownership concentration on innovation. Once we distinguish across types
of shareholders, we uncover some evidence that families support innovation more than ﬁ-
nancial institutions, but that the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial institutions for technological change
increase with their equity stakes. Collectively, the ﬁndings provide support to the view of
recent literature that the agency problems that aﬀect ﬁrms in continental Europe markedly
diﬀer from those in the United States, not only in static but also in technologically dynamic
environments.
JEL Codes: G32, O3
Keywords: Ownership, Agency Problems, Technological Change.
1 Introduction
Technological innovation constitutes one of the key determinants of the economic performance of ﬁrms
and countries (OECD, 2010). Innovation aﬀects the degree to which ﬁrms can enhance their produc-
tivity (Tellis, Prabhu and Chandy, 2007; Comin and Philippon, 2005). It also inﬂuences ﬁrms’ ability
to penetrate into new markets, including foreign ones, or preserve their market leadership (Geroski,
1995). Despite scholars’ and policymakers’ attention to the determinants of innovation, little is known
about the impact that ﬁrms’ governance has on technological progress. Yet, examining the diﬀerent
performance of businesses across countries suggests that governance systems may play a crucial role in
ﬁrms’ ability to advance their technological frontier. For example, it is often claimed that the system
of public companies that is prevalent in the United States is ideal for promoting innovation because it
allows ﬁrms to diversify the risk of innovation across a large number of investors (Aghion, Van Reenen,
and Zingales, 2009). By contrary, in recent years several policymakers have expressed concerns that
family-oriented businesses, such as those typical of some European and East Asian countries, might
be less prone to technological change. For example, families could be reluctant to abandon their
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1traditional core business and venture into risky new activities. The relation between ﬁrms’ ownership
structure and governance, on one side, and innovation, on the other, is far from clear-cut a priori.
Innovation features characteristics that render it distinct from the other activities of a ﬁrm. Moreover,
even looking at the more often studied impact of governance on ﬁrms’ performance, it is now generally
agreed that the lessons one can draw from various U.S.-based studies are not necessarily applicable to
other countries (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002). The optimal governance may stem from
a mix of factors related to the industrial structure and the institutional environment of the country.
For instance, the conﬂicts of interest and agency problems that characterize, say, U.S. businesses
might substantially diﬀer from those that plague businesses in other countries. Speciﬁcally, one could
conjecture that in the United States managerial agency problems may be signiﬁcant, while in Europe
and East Asia the concentration of ownership in the hands of large shareholders may negatively aﬀect
innovation.
The objective of this paper is to shed new light on the eﬀects of ownership on innovation and on the
nature of such eﬀects exploiting a rich survey of over 20,000 Italian manufacturing ﬁrms conducted by
the banking group Capitalia. The dataset provides thorough information on ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀort
which is based directly on ﬁrms’ responses to survey questions. It also contains precise measures
of ﬁrms’ ownership structure, such as the capital shares held by the largest equity-holders, the type
of the equity-holders, as well as the aﬃliation to groups. Italy represents an ideal environment to
study conﬂicts of interest between large and minority shareholders that are thought to be of limited
relevance in the United States. In fact, the Italian corporate sector is characterized by a strong
presence of individual owners that hold sizable equity stakes in companies. Instead, institutional
ownership is far less diﬀused than in the United States. Another advantage of our dataset is the
availability of instruments for ﬁrms’ ownership structure. In fact, a challenge of any study on the
relation between ownership structure and innovation is that unobservable factors can aﬀect both the
governance structure and innovation decisions. Moreover, reverse causality may also be an issue
at play as technological progress itself is likely to shape the ownership structure. Our strategy for
tackling these issues is to employ information on past regulation of Italian ﬁnancial markets. It is
believed that the ability of ﬁrms to obtain external ﬁnance (credit) is a key determinant of ﬁrms’
needs and incentives to open participation to new shareholders, issue new equity and go public.1
We thus employ information on the regulation of Italian local ﬁnancial markets in the late 1930s to
capture exogenous restrictions on the availability of external ﬁnance and construct instruments for
ﬁrms’ ownership structure.
After accounting for the possible endogeneity of the ownership structure and controlling for a vari-
ety of factors that may also aﬀect innovation, we ﬁnd that ownership concentration negatively aﬀects
the probability that ﬁrms innovate (with the negative eﬀect weakening as ownership concentration
increases).2 This result holds regardless of whether we focus on the share of the main equity-holder
or the three largest equity-holders. Furthermore, our results reveal that ownership concentration is
essentially neutral for total investment, signalling that the negative eﬀect of ownership concentration
on innovation does not simply reﬂect a broader eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s total investment. We then turn
to disentangle the mechanisms through which ownership concentration depresses innovation. The
analysis suggests that risk aversion induced by lack of (ﬁnancial or industrial) diversiﬁcation may be
a source of large shareholders’ reluctance to innovate. Indeed, consistent with this view, ownership
concentration depresses investment in R&D, allegedly the riskiest phase of the innovation process,
1For example, the access to bank loans can impact investors’ ability to obtain funds to purchase equity (Caselli and
Gennaioli, 2006) or also the price at which new equity can be issued.
2These results hold for product innovation, while ownership concentration appears to be neutral for process innova-
tion.
2while it is neutral for (a proxy of) technology adoption. In addition, we ﬁnd that conﬂicts of interest
between large and minority shareholders may contribute to the negative eﬀect of ownership concentra-
tion on innovation.3 The last part of the paper examines whether the nature of the main shareholder
plays a role in innovation decisions. Firms led by a family appear to be more prone to innovation
than ﬁrms led by ﬁnancial institutions. However, we ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of ownership by ﬁnancial
institutions for innovation increase with their equity stake.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature.
Section 3 describes the institutional environment. In Section 4, we discuss the predictions of the
theoretical literature. Section 5 details the data, the measurement of the variables, and the econo-
metric methodology. Sections 6 presents estimation results. In Section 7, we try to disentangle the
mechanisms through which ﬁrms’ ownership structure aﬀects innovation decisions. In Section 8, we
carry out additional tests on the role of business and owner type in innovation. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theoretical Studies
This paper relates to a broad theoretical literature on the impact of corporate governance on ﬁrm
performance. The seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) shows that large shareholders have
more incentives to collect information and monitor ﬁrms’ management, thereby mitigating managers’
free riding. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) add that when control rights are concentrated in the hands of
a small number of investors with a large cash ﬂow stake, such investors can more easily coordinate
their actions. However, other papers in this literature suggest that concentrated ownership may
be detrimental to ﬁrm performance because excessive control stiﬂes managerial incentives to acquire
information in situations of uncertainty (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) or because it results into insuﬃcient
liquidity of the shares of the company or inadequate informational content of stock prices (Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1983). Finally, Bolton and von Thadden (1998) stress the beneﬁts of ownership dispersion,
such as larger market liquidity and better risk diversiﬁcation. As we elaborate below, these two
diﬀerent views on the eﬀect of ownership concentration are not necessarily in contrast with each other
because they may apply to diﬀerent contexts. In the case of the United States, where ownership is
widely dispersed, managerial agency problems might undermine ﬁrms’ performance. In this context,
the beneﬁts of ownership concentration could outweigh its costs (in accordance with the Jensen and
Meckling’s view). By contrast, in Europe and East Asia, where ownership is highly concentrated and
large shareholders may pursue they own interests at the expense of other stakeholders, the negative
eﬀects of ownership concentration might outweigh the incentive beneﬁts.
The theoretical literature on ownership and innovation is still underdeveloped. Aghion, Van Reenen
and Zingales (2009) construct a model in which there is a positive association between innovation and
institutional ownership. Their model nests two main reasons for this positive eﬀect: managerial slack
and managers’ career concerns. Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales show that institutional investors
could force managers to innovate (reducing managerial slack), and that they might also insulate
managers from the reputational consequences of bad income realizations. According to this view,
institutional owners have better incentives (they own a larger share of the ﬁrm) and skills (they
own stock in many ﬁrms so they beneﬁt from economies of scope in monitoring) to monitor. This
will encourage innovation. Collectively, our ﬁndings that ownership concentration is detrimental to
3For example, we uncover some evidence that attributing control to the main shareholder fosters innovation, sug-
gesting that aligning cash ﬂow rights with control rights mitigates agency problems inside ﬁrms.
3innovation thus stand in contrast with what predicted by this work on the eﬀect of ownership on
innovation in the United States. This corroborates the view that the agency problems that aﬀect the
United States markedly diﬀer from those aﬀecting other countries. We will further discuss theoretical
predictions on the link between ownership and innovation.
2.2 Empirical Studies
There is extensive empirical evidence on the role of large shareholders in corporate governance. Shleifer
and Vishny (1986), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Zingales (1995) ﬁnd a strong positive relation
between ownership concentration and corporate performance in the United States and other developed
economies and attribute this to large shareholders’ better monitoring (in line with what predicted by
Jensen and Meckling, 1976, for instance). For Japan, Kaplan and Minton (1994) show that ﬁrms with
large shareholders are more likely to replace managers in response to poor performance. Yafeh and
Yosha (1996) uncover evidence that large shareholders reduce discretionary spending by Japanese man-
agers, such as advertising and entertainment expenses. Focussing on transition economies, Claessens
(1997) identiﬁes a positive relationship between ownership concentration and both voucher prices and
stock market prices. Xu and Wang (1999) obtain similar evidence for a sample of listed Chinese com-
panies. Finally, Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) detect a positive relation between
ﬁrm performance and ownership concentration in Russia. In contrast with all these studies, some
other scholars ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of concentration on performance for non-U.S. ﬁrms and attribute
this to the entrenchment eﬀects of concentrated ownership. For example, Claessens, Djankov, Fan,
and Lang (2002) demonstrate that ﬁrm valuation increases with the cash-ﬂow rights of large share-
holders but also ﬁnd a negative entrenchment eﬀect of large controlling shareholders: increases in the
control rights of the largest shareholder are accompanied by declines in ﬁrm values. Gillan and Starks
(2000) survey this empirical literature and conclude that, while some short-term market reaction to
increases in the control right of large shareholders has been documented, there is little evidence of
improvements in long-term operating or stock-market performance.4
The empirical evidence on the impact of ownership structure on innovation is scant and focuses
on the United States. Eng and Shackell (2001) ﬁnd a positive correlation between institutional own-
ership and R&D expenditures. Bushee (1998) conﬁrms this link between institutional ownership and
innovation. In fact, his results indicate that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse a decline
in earnings when institutional ownership is high. Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2009) detect a
positive link between the innovation eﬀort of U.S. ﬁrms and institutional ownership, especially when
product market competition is intense and CEOs are less entrenched (that is, less protected from
hostile takeovers). Sapra, Subramanian and Subramanian (2009) ﬁnd that the innovation of U.S.
ﬁrms has a U-shaped relationship with the level of takeover pressure that ﬁrms face.
3 Institutional Background
Italy provides an ideal environment for isolating the link between ownership concentration and innova-
tion in a context where concentrated corporate ownership is predominant. In Anglo-Saxon countries,
the degree of concentration of publicly listed companies is low and ﬁnancial institutions constitute
the main shareholders. In Italy, instead, in 2000 (roughly the median year of our sample) the main
shareholder of a non-public manufacturing company owned about 65% of the company on average
(Bianco and Bianchi, 2008), with this percentage being larger for big companies. As for the other two
4Similar results are documented in Klein and Zur (2009) and Li et al. (2006).
4main shareholders, Bianco (2003) and Bianco and Bianchi (2008) report that in the same year these
held about 25% so that altogether the top three shareholders held approximately 90% of ﬁrms. Even
restricting attention to listed companies, one still ﬁnds very strong ownership concentration with 44%
of shares detained by the top shareholder. Another salient diﬀerence between the Italian ownership
structure and that of Anglo-Saxon countries regards the identity of the top shareholders. In Italy, in
2000, the State was the main shareholder in 18% of ﬁrms. For non-public manufacturing ﬁrms, the
top shareholder was a family or an individual in 54% of cases, another company in 2% of cases, a
foreign ﬁrm in 13%, and a ﬁnancial holding in 5% of cases. These ﬁgures reveal the importance of
family ﬁrms and the limited presence of ﬁnancial institutions in the ranks of shareholders. The main
reason is that legal prescriptions from the 1930s prevented banks from holding shares in corporations.
Despite a recent change in the legislation (d.lgs. 481/92 and 385/93), the limited role of ﬁnancial
institutions as corporate owners continues to be a characteristic of the Italian capitalism.
Turning to innovation, the Italian economy features a low R&D intensity. For instance, business
R&D statistics published yearly by the OECD suggest that in Italy business R&D spending relative
to value added was 0.9% in 2007, compared to 1.8% in the EU-27 and 2.4% in the OECD countries
(OECD, 2009). Formal R&D spending in the OECD is more relevant in high or medium—high tech
industries (representing 52.6% and 36%, respectively, of total R&D spending in OECD countries),
and tends to be carried out more by medium-sized and large ﬁrms. Both the specialization of Italian
ﬁrms in low—medium tech industries (Malaman, 1997) and the within-industry relatively small size
of Italian ﬁrms (Nicoletti, 2002) might play a role in explaining the low R&D intensity of the Italian
economy. It is however possible that statistics on formal R&D spending underestimate the “true”
innovative eﬀort carried out at the ﬁrm level, particularly for small ﬁrms that are more likely to
engage in informal or “tacit” R&D activities.
4 Theoretical Predictions
How do we expect agency problems to shape the relationship between ownership structure and in-
novation decisions? In order to answer this question, it is crucial to keep in mind the distinctive
properties of innovation. New technologies tend to be informationally opaque (Rajan and Zingales,
2001): an innovation is less understood by third parties (e.g., market participants, courts) and entails
a long gestation period during which few interim signals (e.g., cash ﬂows) are available on its ﬁnal
outcome (Goodacre and Tonks, 1995). A second key property of innovation is its riskiness. When a
ﬁrm makes an investment to improve its processes or products, it can incur into evaluation mistakes
which may render the investment (partially) unproﬁtable (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Harhoﬀ,
Narin, Scherer, and Vopel, 1999). Moreover, when a new technology is introduced entrepreneurs have
a strong incentive to add risk (Gonas, Highﬁeld, and Mullineax, 2004). Third, an innovation requires
large up-front eﬀort and start-up costs (see, e.g., Hall, 2005). Finally, innovations generally have little
salvage value: at the R&D stage, investments consist mostly of salaries and intangible assets (e.g.,
intellectual property); at the adoption stage, the assets that embody the innovation are speciﬁc to the
ﬁrm (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Hall and Khan, 2003).
These various features of innovation are relevant for agency problems and for the impact of gover-
nance (ownership structure) on the principal-agent relationships inside ﬁrms. The U.S. based literature
highlights the positive role of ownership concentration in mitigating agency problems between share-
holders and managers in dispersed companies, such as the U.S. public companies. Consider the case
in which managers tend to be “lazy” (prefer a quite life) or have career concerns. These problems are
likely to be especially severe for innovations: new technologies entail large eﬀort and start-up costs so
5they are naturally conducive to laziness. Moreover, as argued by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales
(2009, p. 3), “Innovation carries a risk for the CEO: if things go wrong for purely stochastic reasons,
the board will start to think he is a bad manager and may ﬁre him. This generates a natural aversion
to innovation”. Whether laziness or career concerns are the problem, if incentive contracts cannot
overcome these problems, a large investor could have the incentive to collect information and moni-
tor managers, forcing them to exert eﬀort and choose innovation optimally. Furthermore, increased
monitoring could improve incentives to innovate by insulating managers from the reputational con-
sequences of bad income realizations. Another problem that is especially severe for innovation is
“short-termism”. Stein (1988) argues that because of asymmetric information, shareholders cannot
properly evaluate investments in long-term innovative projects, and therefore tend to undervalue the
stocks of companies investing in such projects. This, in turn, would make it easier for hostile acquirers
to obtain control of the company by buying its shares at low prices. To protect current shareholders
from such an expropriation, managers will invest less eﬀort and human capital in innovative projects
that are diﬃcult to understand by the market, and more in routine projects with quicker and more
certain returns. If ownership concentration is high, and in particular institutional owners are im-
portant, they will reduce the pressure on managers for myopic investment behavior. Finally, high
concentration can favour managerial long-termism. Manso (2010) develops a theoretical model, and
Azoulay, Manso and Zivin (2009) provide empirical evidence, that greater pressure on innovators and
lower tolerance towards mistakes can lead to lower creativity and less innovation. If one applies this
reasoning, in highly concentrated ﬁrms, and particularly in family ﬁrms where the ownership structure
is more stable, long-termism of investors might promote investments in R&D and new technologies
(Lehmann and Weigand, 2000).
In the United States, only few ﬁrms are controlled by a large investor, so as we have just seen the
U.S. based literature focuses on the beneﬁts of large shareholders in mitigating managerial agency
problems while it downplays the costs of having large shareholders. The most obvious of these costs
is that large investors are not diversiﬁed (Bolton and von Thadden, 1998). Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
show that large, undiversiﬁed equity-holders can distort ﬁrms’ investment decisions because of their
risk aversion. This problem is likely to be especially severe for innovations because they are very risky.
In this case, ownership concentration will reduce diversiﬁcation, thus depressing the incentive to inno-
vate. Indeed, Morck and Yeung (2003) build on the New Endogenous Growth Theory (that maintains
that large part of economic growth occurs as Schumpeterian “creative destruction”) and highlight
that families might be reluctant to back innovation.5 A second problem is that large shareholders
can pursue their own interests, which need not coincide with the interests of the other shareholders
of the ﬁrm. Expropriation of minority stakeholders is likely to be easier for informationally opaque
new technologies and, hence, other stakeholders will be less prone to innovation. Conﬂicts between
large and minority shareholders are typical in concentrated companies in Europe and South East Asia,
especially because the divergence between cash-ﬂow rights and control rights tends to be large. In
fact, particularly in countries with poor shareholder protection, even the largest ﬁrms tend to have
controlling shareholders (sometimes the State, more often a family). Such controlling shareholders
often have control over ﬁrms considerably in excess of their cash ﬂow rights. In part, this occurs
because they control ﬁrms through pyramidal groups, and in part because they directly manage the
ﬁrms they control (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). Anderson and Reeb (2003) sug-
gest that large shareholders, families in particular, have two ways to exert their inﬂuence: holding the
CEO position or maintaining excessive representation on the board of directors. Thus, expropriation
5Recent empirical ﬁndings on R&D spending are consistent with this hypothesis. For example, Morck, Stangeland,
and Yeung (2000) ﬁnd that Canadian ﬁrms controlled by heirs are less active in research and development.
6of minority shareholders could be greater when family members have a strong presence in the board.
In general, the relative beneﬁts and costs of having large shareholders ultimately depend on the
institutional framework of the country and in particular on such factors as the legal protection of
investors and of minority rights, bankruptcy laws, restrictions on managerial self-dealing, restrictions
on ownership and control by ﬁnancial institutions and on cross-ownership, and the presence of liquid
capital markets supporting takeovers (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
5 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.1 The Empirical Model
In the ﬁrst part of our analysis, we investigate the eﬀect of ownership concentration on innovation.
Denote by y∗ the diﬀerence between the return that an entrepreneur expects to appropriate from a
new technology and the expected return on an existent technology. The entrepreneur’s decision to
innovate can be modeled as:
y =
￿
1 if y∗ > 0
0 otherwise
(1)
y∗ = xa1 + z1d11 + u1, (2)
where y is a measure of the innovation choice (e.g., a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the
ﬁrm innovates and zero otherwise), x is a measure of the capital share held by the main shareholder(s),
z1 denotes a vector of controls, and u1 is the residual.
In testing for the eﬀect of ownership concentration on innovation, we must account for the possi-
bility that ownership structure and innovation are jointly determined and that there exist unobserved
factors that are correlated with both. The literature on the economics of technological change and in-
dustrial organization oﬀers predictions on possible common determinants of innovation and ownership
structure. These include ﬁrm characteristics and local market conditions. For example, informational
transparency is among the relevant internal features of a ﬁrm that may aﬀect innovation (Cohen,
1995). The informational transparency of the ﬁrm may also aﬀect its ownership structure because
asymmetric information determines the availability of equity and debt (see, e.g., Rajan, 1992, and
Rajan and Zingales, 2001). Another characteristic that may aﬀect both innovation and ownership
structure is production eﬃciency. On the one hand, higher eﬃciency implies a higher return and
probability of success both of mature and new technologies. On the other hand, higher eﬃciency may
also attract new investors to the ﬁrm, aﬀecting its ownership structure. Also, local market conditions
may be a common determinant of innovation and ownership structure. For example, tax policy is
a critical determinant of ownership structure (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000), but also aﬀects ﬁrms’
innovation choices (Levine, 1991). Moreover, the endogeneity of ownership structure may stem from
the reverse causality between ownership and innovation.6 A ﬁnal issue relevant for our analysis is the
attenuation bias that may aﬀect our estimates and that can originate from errors in the measurement
of the share of capital held by the main shareholder(s), which, in our data, is reported by the person
within the ﬁrm in charge of answering the survey questionnaire.7
We address these endogeneity issues using an instrumental variable approach. We deﬁne z2 as
a vector of instrumental variables that are correlated with the ownership structure but aﬀect the
6Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) ﬁnd evidence of reverse causality between ownership and ﬁrm performance.
7The agency in charge of running the survey for Capitalia identiﬁes by phone the person within each ﬁrm to submit
the survey to. This person is generally the administrator or the entrepreneur, who is subsequently contacted and
interviewed by phone.
7innovation decision only through the ownership channel. The eﬀect of these instruments on x is
captured by d22 in the ‘‘ownership equation’’:
x = z1d21 + z2d22 + u2, (3)
where z1 refers to the control variables in (2), z2 is the vector of instruments, and u2 is the residual.
We estimate the model in (1)-(2) using two methods, two-stage least squares (2SLS) and Newey
(1987)’s Amemya’s generalized least squares (AGLS) for limited dependent variable models. The 2SLS
estimation assumes that the probability of innovation is linear in x and z1. Usually, with dicothomous
dependent variables, 2SLS work well for values of the explanatory variables close to sample averages,
but it suﬀers from two limitations. The ﬁrst is that predicted values can fall outside the unit interval
of probabilities. The second is that the model restricts the partial eﬀect of any explanatory variable
(expressed in levels) to be constant. Despite that, 2SLS provide a consistent estimate of the (partial)
eﬀect of ownership concentration on the probability of innovating, averaged across the distribution of
the other controls.8 In addition to 2SLS, we estimate the model using the AGLS estimator for probit
models, which is a minimum chi-square estimator.9 This is less eﬃcient than maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE), but is computationally robust and produces consistent estimates and accurate
standard errors when the dependent variable is dicothomous and the endogenous explanatory variable
is continuous (Newey, 1987). Furthermore, based on Adkins’ (2009) simulations, AGLS estimators
perform better than MLE for probit when instruments are relatively weak. OLS and maximum
likelihood probit estimation results are also reported.
5.2 Data Description
Our main data source is a sample of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms surveyed by the Italian banking group
Capitalia. We use four waves of the Capitalia survey, which cover three-year periods ending respec-
tively in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006. The data set includes a representative sample of all ﬁrms with 10
to 500 employees and the universe of ﬁrms with more than 500 employees (about 6 percent of ﬁrms
in the sample). Overall, approximately 4500 ﬁrms were interviewed in each survey wave. Collected
data include: information on product and process innovation, R&D investment and other innovation
variables; information on the three largest shareholders, including their type and equity shares, as
well as details on the ownership structure; balance sheet data; company characteristics, including
demographics, data on management and employment at various organizational levels, participation
in groups and consortia of ﬁrms, data on the market for the ﬁrm’s products, on the relationship with
customers, suppliers and banks, and information regarding sources of ﬁnance. Three, four or ﬁve-digit
industry codes (ATECO codes) are also reported. Some of these variables are available for each year
covered by the survey (e.g., balance sheet data); some refer to the time of interview (e.g., participation
in groups); others refer to the three-year period covered by the survey.
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the variables that we will use in the empirical analysis
(see the Appendix for details regarding the construction of the variables). The ﬁrms’ geographic
distribution reveals a predominance of ﬁrms located in the North of Italy (68% of the total), while 21%
of the ﬁrms are based in the Center and 11% in the South. The distribution among sectors, deﬁned
8Running least squares on a dichotomous variable results into ineﬃcient estimates by deﬁnition, since the structure
of the estimation is guaranteed to create heteroscedasticity (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). We deal with this issue by using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
9This estimator consists ﬁrst of estimating a reduced form for the endogenous regressor (i.e., for our measure of
ownership concentration) and computing the residual. Then, generalized least squares are applied to a reduced form
for the probit model for innovation. The explanatory variables of the probit model include all the exogenous variables
and instruments plus the residual from the ﬁrst-step estimation.
8according to Pavitt’s taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984), shows the predominance of businesses operating in
traditional manufacturing sectors (almost half of the sample). The portion of high technology ﬁrms
is very low, failing to exceed 5% of the sample. The average dimension of ﬁrms, as measured by
the number of employees, is small to medium (with an average of 105 employees and a median of
34). The mean level of annual sales is 242,500 euro, while the median is 55,000 euro. As for other
characteristics that are relevant for our analysis, it is worth mentioning that ﬁrms report to maintain
credit relationships with 6 banks, on average, although there is a lot of heterogeneity across ﬁrms.
The mean length of the relationship with the bank providing most credit is 17 years versus a mean
ﬁrm age since inception of 24.
For the analysis, we also use data from other sources. We employ data made available by the
Bank of Italy on the presence of banks in local markets. We use data provided by the Italian National
Statistics Oﬃce (ISTAT) on civil suits and population per judicial district, as well as on the value
added and population of provinces. Finally, we employ some indices of ﬁnancial development: one
is Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) index of local ﬁnancial development, the others are Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) measures of external ﬁnancial dependence for
manufacturing ﬁrms, by sector of activity.10
5.3 Innovation
In the analysis, we distinguish between product and process innovation because the two tend to respond
to diﬀerent objectives and, more importantly, diﬀerent factors can have very diﬀerent impact on the
two types of innovation (see, for example, Cohen, 1995, and Cohen and Klepper, 1996). To study
innovation, we use a measure based on ﬁrms’ responses to the following survey question: “In the last
three years, did the ﬁrm realize product innovations, process innovations, organizational innovations
related to product innovations, organizational innovations related to process innovations?”. We deﬁne
two binary variables that take the value of one if the ﬁrm innovated and zero otherwise: (a) Innoprod
refers to product or related organizational innovation; (b) Innoproc refers to realized process or related
organizational innovation.11 Moreover, the surveys ask each ﬁrm, “In the last three years, did the
ﬁrm carry out R&D expenditures?”. Through this question, we construct another dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm carried out some R&D, zero otherwise. Later in the analysis,
we will introduce and discuss other variables capturing speciﬁc aspects of innovation.
In our sample, 39 percent of the ﬁrms report some product or product-related innovation over
the three years covered by the survey; 51 percent report some process or process-related innovation;
43 percent report some R&D expenditure. The correlation among these three variables is between
0.3 and 0.4. Table 1 reports ﬁrms’ characteristics for the whole sample and for sub-samples of ﬁrms:
we distinguish between ﬁrms that have carried out or not some product innovation (second and
third column), some process innovation (fourth and ﬁfth column), and some R&D investment (last
two columns). Innovators exhibit higher ownership concentration, are substantially less likely to be
private limited companies (LTDs; societa’ a responsabilita’ limitata) and more likely to be public
limited companies (PLCs; societa’ per azioni) or listed companies. They are also more likely to
belong to a group or a consortium. Relative to ﬁrms that do not innovate, the main shareholder is less
often an individual person or a family as opposed to a ﬁnancial institution or a bank. Firms carrying
out process innovation and R&D are relatively more likely to be owned by other manufacturing ﬁrms
or holding companies. Innovators are more often in high-tech industries than in traditional ones,
10See the Appendix for details on these variables.
11All our results are virtually identical whether we lump product and process innovations together with related
organizational innovations or not. Thus, we construct the variables including organizational innovations.
9maintain a relationship with more banks, are older, are about twice the size of non-innovators in
terms of number of employees, assets and sales, and are somewhat more likely to be located in the
North of the country.
5.4 Ownership Structure
The strength of our data set lies in the highly detailed data on ownership structure, and in particular
information on the three largest shareholders, including their types and equity shares. A ﬁrst key
explanatory variable is the ownership concentration of the ﬁrm, which we proxy by the equity share
of the main shareholder(s). The data conﬁrm that concentration is high among Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms. On average, in our dataset, the largest shareholder owns 57 percent of equity and in 15 percent
of cases the main shareholder owns all equity; the three largest shareholders, together, own over 80
percent, on average. 57 percent of ﬁrms are private limited companies; 39 percent are public limited
companies; and 1 percent of ﬁrms are publicly listed. In 77 percent of the ﬁrms the main shareholder
is an individual or a family; in 10 percent it is a bank or a ﬁnancial institution; in the remaining 13
percent it is another manufacturing ﬁrm or a holding company. Finally, 24 percent are part of a group
or of a consortium of ﬁrms.
The surveys also ask if the main shareholders have direct control over the ﬁrm (91 percent of cases)
and are part of a shareholder voting agreement (48 percent of cases). Finally, the data give us the
possibility to detect if the ﬁrm made acquisitions or divestitures in the years of survey. In our data
set, 10% of the ﬁrms made acquisitions while 3% were involved in a divestiture.
5.5 Instruments
To implement our empirical model we need an appropriate set of instruments for the measure of
ownership concentration, i.e. for the share of capital held by the main shareholder(s). Our strategy
relies on identifying exogenous restrictions on the local ﬁnancial system that aﬀect ﬁrms’ ownership
concentration but not directly ﬁrms’ propensity to innovate. To this end, we exploit the 1936 banking
law which subjected the Italian banking system to strict regulation of entry. The rationale for using
(measures of the constrictiveness of) this regulation to instrument ownership concentration is that it
plausibly aﬀected ﬁrms’ need and incentive to open participation to new shareholders, issue new equity
and go public. Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) suggest that the evolution of ﬁrms’ ownership
structure depends on the development of primary capital markets in the economy. Aganin and Volpin
(2004) show that in Italy, due to a joint negative eﬀect of laws and politics on ﬁnancial markets, the
majority of ﬁrms stay away from the stock market and are closely held by the founders’ families.
We have in mind three possible channels through which local credit market conditions can aﬀect
ownership structure. First, when restrictions on the local supply of credit are more severe, it could be
more diﬃcult for potential acquirers to obtain the liquidity necessary to purchase the shares of other
ﬁrms. Caselli and Gennaioli (2006) demonstrate theoretically that less eﬃcient credit markets prevent
investors from borrowing and acquiring ﬁrms’ equity. This would in turn aﬀect the distribution of
ownership inside companies. Second, tighter restrictions on the local supply of credit may force a
ﬁrm to resort to alternative sources of external ﬁnance by issuing equity. Myers (1984) argues that if
external ﬁnancing is required, ﬁrms issue the safest security ﬁrst (debt). Therefore, when the credit
market conditions limit the possibility to apply for bank credit, ﬁrms may resort to equity. Finally,
a strand of literature suggests that the credit market may oﬀer signals to potential shareholders. For
example, for the United States, Shockley and Thakor (1992) ﬁnd that the existence or renewal of a
loan is a positive signal to potential shareholders. For this reason, restrictions on the local supply of
10loans may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s ability to issue new equity.
The objective of the 1936 Italian banking regulation was to enhance bank stability through severe
restrictions on competition. In fact, in the late 1920s and early 1930s the Italian regulatory authorities
formed the opinion that an excess of competition was at the root of the recurrent problems of bank
instability. The banking law that was enacted imposed strict limits on the ability of diﬀerent types
of credit institutions to open new branches. Speciﬁcally, each credit institution was attributed a
geographical area of competence based on its presence in 1936 and its ability to grow and lend was
restricted to that area. A further directive issued in 1938 regulated diﬀerentially the ability of credit
institutions to grow. National banks (banche di interesse nazionale) could open branches only in
the main cities; cooperative and local commercial banks could open branches within the boundaries
of the province where they operated in 1936; savings banks could expand within the boundaries of
the region (which comprises several provinces) where they operated in 1936.12 Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2003, 2004) demonstrate that the 1936 banking law deeply impacted local credit markets
(creation and location of new branches). For example, between 1936 and 1985, in Italy the total
number of bank branches grew by 87 percent versus 1228 percent in the United States. By contrast,
during the period of deregulation13 (1985-late 1990s), the total number of branches grew by 79 percent,
versus 43 percent in the United States. Because ownership is a rather persistent ﬁrm characteristic,
the 1936 banking regulation has most likely deeply aﬀected ﬁrms’ ownership structure for several years
even after its lifting. Hence, the regulation is an appropriate instrument for our measure of ownership
structure.
To identify the eﬀects of ownership concentration on the propensity to innovate, we will exploit
the diﬀerences in the conscrictiveness of regulation across local credit markets. The variation in the
tightness of restrictions can be safely considered exogenous because in 1936, when the regulation
was introduced, the local credit market structure was independent of local market characteristics that
could aﬀect the ability to do banking and the ability of ﬁrms to grow. As discussed by Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2003, 2004), in 1936 the distribution of types of banks across provinces, and hence the
constrictiveness of regulation in a province, was not the result of market forces, but of a government-
directed consolidation activity occurred during the 1930-1933 crisis.14 In addition to this, and relevant
for the exogeneity of our instruments, the regulation was not designed with the needs of the diﬀerent
provinces in mind. In fact, the diﬀerences in the restrictions imposed on the various types of banks
were related to diﬀerences in the connections of the banks with the Fascist regime.15 Finally, in that
period there was a bias against large banks, due to their role during the 1930-33 banking crisis.
In practice, as instruments we use the four indicators that Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003)
employ to characterize the local structure of the banking system in 1936, and thus the conscrictiveness
12Provinces are local entities established by the Italian law, with the size of US counties. They are approximately
100 and are grouped in 20 regions.
13In 1984, the geographical restrictions on lending were broadened; in 1986 the procedure for opening new branches
was relaxed. Finally, any form of restriction was lifted during the early 1990s.
14The Italian government bailed out the major national banks and saving banks, but let smaller commercial banks
and cooperative banks fail. Furthermore, the distribution of diﬀerent types of banks reﬂected the interaction between
previous waves of bank creation and the history of Italian uniﬁcation. For instance, the strong presence of savings
banks in the North East and the Center stemmed from the fact that this institution originated in Austria and started to
operate ﬁrst in the provinces dominated by the Austrian Empire (Lombardia and the North East) and in closer states
(especially Tuscany and the Papal States). By contrast, two of the major national banks (Banca Commerciale and
Credito Italiano) were the result of direct German investments in Lombardia and Liguria, the most advanced regions
at the time.
15In particular, savings banks were one of the principal ﬁnancial supporter of the regime. Savings banks were non-
proﬁt organizations and they had to distribute their proﬁts to “charitable activities”. After 1931 these donations were
concentrated toward political organizations created by the Fascists.
11of regulation. These indicators are: i. the number of bank branches in the province (per 100,000
inhabitants); ii. the share of bank branches owned by local banks over total banks in the province;
iii. the number of savings banks in the province (per 100,000 inhabitants); and, iv. the number of
cooperative banks in the province (per 100,000 inhabitants). Based on the discussion above, provinces
with more bank branches in 1936, with a higher share of branches of local banks, with relatively more
savings banks and less cooperative banks should have suﬀered less from the freeze. Besides these
indicators, other variables that are likely to reﬂect the conscrictiveness of the 1936 banking regulation
are the (annual) number of new bank branches created within a province (net of branches closed) after
the lifting of the regulation. Following Herrera and Minetti (2007), we distinguish between branches
created by incumbent banks and branches created by entrant banks in the province (per 100,000
inhabitants) and impute these variables as the average over the 1991-1998 period.
Our instruments could be criticized on the ground that cyclical variations in the economic activity
of a province after the deregulation are correlated both with our instruments and with ﬁrms’ current
innovation decisions. Thus, in our regressions we control for the growth rate of the value added
of the province imputed as the average over the 1991-98 period. In addition to this, to reduce the
risk that our historical instruments have an independent eﬀect (i.e., other than through the ownership
structure) on the current propensity to innovate, we include in the regressions some variables proxying
for current local lending conditions, such as the number of bank branches in the province where the
ﬁrm is headquartered, the Herﬁndhal-Hirschman Index on bank loans and the ﬁnancial development
index put forth by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004). To conclude, a broader argument in defense
of our strategy relates to the unclear importance of province-level characteristics for ﬁrms’ innovation.
Cohen (1995) stresses that few studies have controlled for the impact of local characteristics on ﬁrms’
technological innovation and that the results of these studies are mixed. All in all, we have reasons
to believe that the correlation between our instruments and the residual in the innovation equation is
negligible.
In addition to the above variables, as a robustness check, in some regressions we include in our set
of instruments a measure of external ﬁnancial dependence that captures the diﬀerent dependence of
industrial sectors on external sources of ﬁnance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In particular, we use the
measure of ﬁnancial dependence from Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) and interact that with the four
indicators from Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003). Financial dependence can be expected to aﬀect
the ownership structure of a business, and in particular the degree of concentration of ownership, but
it is unlikely to have a direct impact on the ﬁrm’s propensity to innovate, which depends on actual
credit availability. Finally, we will discuss additional instruments for speciﬁc aspects of innovation
later in the paper.
5.6 Control Variables
We now discuss the other explanatory variables included in the regressions. More details on these
variables are in the Appendix. The literature suggests that the probability of innovation is a function
of the value and pledgeability of the assets of a ﬁrm. In fact, if the ﬁrm’s innovation fails, its ﬁnanciers
(e.g., banks) will recover the liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s assets (Rajan, 1992). Thus, the larger
and the more easily pleadgeable the assets, the easier will be for the ﬁrm to obtain external funds
for the innovation. We measure the assets of a ﬁrm by the total assets and their pledgeability by
two proxies for asset liquidity, the ratio of current to total assets and the ratio of inventories to total
assets. The predictions of the literature about the eﬀect of these variables are ambiguous. Some
studies suggest that more liquid assets are more pledgeable, others argue that more liquid assets are
easier to expropriate and, hence, less pledgeable (Myers and Rajan, 1998). Another element that could
12impact innovation is the veriﬁability of the entrepreneur’s actions and output. This, in turn, depends
on the informational opaqueness of the ﬁrm and on the eﬃciency of courts. Young ﬁrms are allegedly
more informationally opaque than older ones because they lack an established track record. Hence,
we control for the natural logarithm of age and its square, where the age of the ﬁrm is measured from
the ﬁrm’s inception. The literature also suggests that small ﬁrms are more informationally opaque
than bigger ones because they are not monitored by rating agencies or by the ﬁnancial press (Petersen
and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998). We measure size by total sales (results with the number
of employees are qualitatively similar). Regarding the eﬃciency of courts, we control for the number
of civil suits pending in each of the 27 judicial districts of Italy per 1,000 inhabitants. A high number
of pending suits could reﬂect an ineﬃcient enforcement system (Bianco, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2005).
This variable is imputed to the ﬁrms according to the district where they are headquartered. The
literature has identiﬁed several factors that may aﬀect the return advantage of innovations (Cohen,
1995). A ﬁrst factor is size: bigger ﬁrms can distribute the ﬁxed costs of innovation over a larger
volume of sales, which we account for. Another factor is diversiﬁcation. Diversiﬁed ﬁrms have more
chances for applying new knowledge and exploiting economies of scope associated with innovation.
Presumably, the higher the number of industries in which the ﬁrm is active, the more diversiﬁed the
ﬁrm is. For this reason, we construct dummy variables equal to one when the ﬁrm is classiﬁed in a
four- or ﬁve-digit ATECO sector (zero otherwise). An additional factor is age. Plausibly, older ﬁrms
are less ﬂexible and face higher adjustment costs when innovating (Hall and Khan, 2003).
Other factors that can aﬀect the likelihood of innovation are local lending conditions and access
to ﬁnancial resources in general. In fact, external ﬁnancing can aﬀect the possibility to obtain funds,
to make R&D expenditures and implement new technologies (Hall, 2005). Moreover, the information
of a bank can aﬀect the expected return of an innovation over and above its allocation between
entrepreneur and bank. When a ﬁrm engages in an R&D race for a patentable innovation, the bank
can disclose information to the ﬁrm’s rivals (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Yosha, 1995). In practice,
we control for access to bank credit by including in our regressions the number of banks with which
the ﬁrm maintains a relationship, the duration of the relationship with the main bank (i.e., with the
bank granting the largest share of credit) and a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm reports to
be credit rationed, zero otherwise. Furthermore, we insert some variables to control for the structural
characteristics of the banking sector at the time of the survey, such as the number of bank branches
(per 100,000 inhabitants), the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index on bank loans (in the province) and the
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) ﬁnancial development index. These variables controlling for
access to ﬁnancial resources allow to account also for any direct eﬀect that the 1936 banking law has
on the current structure of local credit markets. Hence, they ensure that our instruments satisfy the
exclusion restrictions, conditional on the set of explanatory variables.
Finally, we include the provincial GDP growth and sector dummies based on a two-digit ATECO
classiﬁcation. As Cohen (1995) argues, industry dummies perform well in capturing the probability
that a ﬁrm faces innovation opportunities because they can capture intra-industry knowledge spillovers
or the competitiveness of the industry. Last, some factors, including the quality of infrastructure and
the level of crime, could diﬀer across the three macro areas of Italy (North, Center, and South). We
code dummies for whether a ﬁrm is located in the Center or in the South of Italy, to account for the
possible consequences of these factors on innovation opportunities and on the returns from innovation.
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6.1 Main Results
Table 2 reports OLS and probit estimates of the likelihood of realizing some product or product-
related innovation (columns 1-3) and some process or process-related innovation (columns 4-6). OLS
estimates are in the upper panel of the table; probit estimates are in the lower panel. Tables 3 and
4 report IV estimates. All our results are virtually identical whether we lump product and process
innovations together with related organizational innovations or not. Henceforth, we focus on the
results obtained by including organizational innovations. In columns 1 and 4 of Table 2, we regress
the innovation dummies on our ﬁrst measure of ownership concentration, the capital share held by
the main shareholder. The list of controls is described in the previous section and is also reported in
the note to the table. Let us ﬁrst consider the OLS estimates. We ﬁnd that the larger the capital
share held by the main shareholder, the greater is the probability that the ﬁrm carries out product
innovation. Instead, in the regression for process innovation, the coeﬃcient on the capital share of the
main shareholder is statistically insigniﬁcant. In the probit estimation, the coeﬃcients of our measure
of ownership concentration are 0.185 for product innovation and 0.041 for process innovation; the z-
statistics are 4.30 and 0.95, respectively.16 In columns 2-3 and 5-6, instead of controlling for ownership
concentration by looking only at the main shareholder, we use the capital share held by the two largest
shareholders or alternatively by the three largest ones. The sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients
are unaﬀected.
As discussed earlier, the OLS and the probit estimates are likely to be biased due to omission of
variables that could be correlated with both innovation and ownership concentration. The direction of
this omitted variable bias is not clear a priori. In fact, for example, our controls for ﬁrms’ informational
transparency and production eﬃciency may be imperfect. In general, a higher degree of informational
transparency is likely to facilitate innovation by attracting outside investors. At the same time, it is
also likely to reduce the need for monitoring by shareholders and, hence, for ownership concentration.
As another example, consider production eﬃciency. Higher eﬃciency may increase the beneﬁts of
innovation and thus promote it. At the same time it can also attract new equity holders, reducing
ownership concentration. Instrumental variable estimation allows us to address these issues. In
practice, we choose our instruments out of the set of variables reﬂecting the constrictiveness of the
1936 banking regulation in Italy, with the exact set varying somewhat depending on the speciﬁc
regression (full details are reported in the notes to the tables). The exact choice of instruments is
based on ﬁrst-stage regressions, i.e. on the ability of the instrumental variables to predict ownership
concentration, conditioning on the exogenous variables included. Tables 3 and 4 report the results
of IV estimation using 2SLS on the linear probability model and AGLS for the probit speciﬁcation.
Table 3 displays the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients on the excluded instruments (the coeﬃcients on the other
variables are available upon request). The capital share held by the main shareholder is increasing in
the number of bank branches in the province in 1936 and in the number of branches created by new
entrants over the 1991-1998 period, supporting the hypothesis that greater availability of bank credit
reduces the need to sell equity. Instead, it is decreasing in the relative importance of local banks and
in the diﬀusion of savings banks (but the latter coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant). Overall,
the partial R2 of the instruments is around 0.002. Hence, the instruments leave a large fraction of
variation in ownership concentration unexplained, but this is typical in micro data. Nevertheless, the
16The coeﬃcients of the linear probability model are a direct estimate of the (partial) eﬀects of the explanatory
variables on the probability of innovation. Instead, with probit estimation, to gauge such eﬀects, the common approach
is to divide the coeﬃcient estimates by 2.5 (Wooldrige, 2002; p. 466).
14instruments are jointly highly signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.0000). The ﬁrst-stage F-statistics are between
5 and 6.17 The p-values of the overidentiﬁcation tests, reported in Table 4, show that, except for
the regressions for process innovation, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the regression residual at standard levels of conﬁdence. Finally, in Table 4 we also
report the p-value for a test of exogeneity of our measure of ownership concentration in the probit.18
Based on this test, we reject the null hypothesis that the equity share is exogenous with respect to
the propensity to carry out product innovation, but we generally do not reject this hypothesis with
respect to the propensity to carry out process innovation.
In Table 4, we report the results of the second-stage of the IV estimation. Henceforth, we provide
comments on the AGLS probit estimates; the 2SLS estimates are qualitatively similar. Once we
account for the problem of endogeneity, the impact of ownership concentration on the likelihood of
innovation becomes negative. The negative impact on product innovation is large (with the coeﬃcients
equal to -2.852 and -1.406, depending on the set of instruments used) and signiﬁcant (with z-statistic
equal to -2.54 and -1.85). The estimated coeﬃcients imply that increasing the equity share of the main
shareholder by one standard deviation would reduce the likelihood of innovation by over 15 percent,
which corresponds to almost 40 percent of the mean. The impact on process innovation becomes
negative too (for some set of instruments, columns 5a and 5b), but it remains insigniﬁcant. This
could stem from the fact the process innovation generally consists of minor technological advances,
which may be only loosely related to ownership structure. The eﬀect of ownership concentration on
product innovation is economically sizable, especially when compared to the eﬀect of control variables
such as ﬁrm characteristics or local market conditions. Interestingly, our negative coeﬃcients should
be considered an upper bound to the true estimates of the eﬀects of interest, because of the relative
weakness of our instruments which makes our ﬁndings somewhat biased towards OLS (Stock, Wright
and Yogo, 2002). Further, results are robust to using diﬀerent sets of instruments, such as adding the
squares of the variables used as instruments, the squares of balance sheet variables, and using other
subsets of the variables reﬂecting the constrictiveness of the 1936 banking regulation. For product
innovation the sign, size and signiﬁcance of estimated coeﬃcients does not change when we consider
the capital shares held by the two and three largest shareholders (Table 5). For process innovation
the coeﬃcient of these measures of concentration remains negative and insigniﬁcant.
The results for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables are generally consistent with the ﬁndings of the
empirical literature on the determinants of innovation. As for ﬁrm characteristics, we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient on the book value of assets is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The ratio of current-
to-total assets has a large negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect, whereas inventories have a positive impact.
The coeﬃcient of the size of the ﬁrm, as measured by its sales, is positive but non signiﬁcant for
product innovation, while it is negative and signiﬁcant (at the 5% level) for process innovation. The
polynomial in age is statistically signiﬁcant and suggests a convex relationship. As for the ATECO
dummies that capture the degree of diversiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that their coeﬃcients are never statistically
signiﬁcant. This result contrasts with the predictions of the theoretical literature but matches several
ﬁndings of the empirical literature (Cohen, 1995).
Regarding the variables controlling for the characteristics of the environment in which ﬁrms op-
erate, we ﬁnd that bank branch density in the province has a positive eﬀect on the probability of
innovating. The coeﬃcients on the Herﬁndhal index on bank loans and on the Guiso, Sapienza, and
17An F-statistic between 5 and 6 signals that we could have a weak instruments problem, such that our estimates
could be biased toward their OLS counterparts. However, based on Stock and Yogo (2002)’s tabulation of the critical
values for the weak instrument test, we reject the null of a relative bias greater than 20 percent.
18In the AGLS probit estimator, in the second stage we include the residual from the ﬁrst-stage OLS regression as
regressor. The Wald test is a test of signiﬁcance on the coeﬃcient of this residual.
15Zingales (2004) index of ﬁnancial development are generally not signiﬁcant. The growth rate of the
value added of the province has a positive impact on the probability of introducing innovations, but
its coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. Also, the dummies for Center and South are not statistically signif-
icant. Finally, let us brieﬂy look at the variables proxying for external ﬁnance. The likelihood of
innovations is signiﬁcantly decreasing in the duration of the credit relationship with the main bank.
This result could match the theoretical view that informed ﬁnanciers reduce ﬁrms’ innovation in order
to preserve their informational rents on traditional technologies (see Minetti, 2010). As a robustness
check, we use the number of banking relationships as a control (columns 3a and 3b) and obtain that
the likelihood of innovations is increasing in the number of relationships, which is consistent with the
view that multiple banks reduce the incidence of moral hazard (hold-up) by the lenders (Rajan, 1992;
Petersen and Rajan, 1994). As for credit rationing, perhaps surprisingly, the results suggest it has a
positive impact on innovation (columns 4a and 4b).
In Table 6, we present (second-stage) results from the estimation of the linear probability models
for innovation of Tables 3 and 4 where, in addition to ownership concentration, we instrument the
variables capturing the relationships between ﬁrms and banks (which might also be endogenous to
the innovation choice). As instruments, we use the same variables capturing the restrictions to the
local supply for credit that we use to instrument the capital share. The results regarding the eﬀect
of ownership concentration on innovation are unaﬀected. In the regression for product innovation,
when we instrument the duration of the main credit relationship and the number of banks, both
their coeﬃcients become positive, but not signiﬁcant. If we instrument credit rationing, its coeﬃcient
becomes negative and not signiﬁcant.19 In the regression for process innovation, the coeﬃcient of the
duration of the main credit relationship remains negative and insigniﬁcant. As the results for the
other variables are unaﬀected by our choice of variables proxying for external ﬁnance and do not vary
whether we instrument it or not, in the rest of the analysis we will use the duration of the main credit
relationship and treat it as exogenous, unless explicitly mentioned.20
6.2 Non-linear Eﬀects
In the regressions displayed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, we allow for non-linearities in the eﬀect of
ownership concentration on innovation. The literature argues that the eﬀect of ownership concentra-
tion on the value of a ﬁrm may be non-linear (Stultz, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). For
example, the presence of ﬁxed monitoring costs could imply that large shareholders monitor only if
their equity holdings exceed some threshold. Therefore, ﬁrms’ performance might decrease with more
concentrated ownership, but, beyond some level of concentration, the positive eﬀects associated with
large shareholders’ incentives to monitor could overcome the negative ones associated with expropria-
tion incentives. We check this by adding a quadratic term in the capital share held by the main owner
and we instrument also this term.21 Overall, the instruments are jointly highly statistically signiﬁcant
and we do not reject the overidentifying restrictions for either product or process innovation. In the
2SLS regressions, the likelihood of product and process innovation appears to be convex in ownership
concentration, with turning point at around 70 percent of total capital, which corresponds to the 70th
19The results in the table are based on a linear probability model assumption for credit rationing (which is a dicotho-
mous variable). However, results are robust to instrumenting credit rationing using the ﬁtted probability from a probit
for credit rationing, as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009).
20Based on the estimation of a non-linear probability model, the evidence is in all respect similar. The results are
available upon request.
21As reported in the note to the table, following Wooldridge (2002), to the set of instruments used so far, we add the
square of the balance sheet variables included as right-hand-side controls in the regressions for innovation. First-stage
regressions are available upon request.
16percentile of the distribution of ownership concentration. When allowing for a quadratic relation-
ship, ownership concentration becomes signiﬁcant also in the regression for process innovation. The
evidence based on AGLS probit estimation is similar in size and sign.
In columns 3 through 10, we report the results from running the regressions for product innovation
on sub-samples of observations. First, we distinguish between small and large ﬁrms, based on the
number of employees (columns 3 and 4). The impact of ownership concentration turns out to be
negative and signiﬁcant only for relatively large ﬁrms with at least 34 employees, which is the median
number of employees in our sample. The coeﬃcient equals -2.887 and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In
smaller ﬁrms the eﬀect is negative, but lower and insigniﬁcant. When distinguishing across sectors of
activity (columns 5 and 6), we ﬁnd that concentration has a negative, large (coeﬃcient equal to -6.021)
and signiﬁcant (z = -2.12) impact for ﬁrms operating in traditional sectors (such as textiles, food and
tobacco). By contrast, the impact is not signiﬁcant for high-tech ﬁrms. However, for high-tech ﬁrms
ownership concentration is typically very high with the main shareholder holding 100 percent of equity
in 25 percent of cases, versus less than 10 percent of cases among traditional ﬁrms. Concentration has
also a negative and signiﬁcant impact (z = -2.36), with a coeﬃcient equal to -3.874, in sectors where
economies of scale are not important, which include many traditional ﬁrms, whereas its coeﬃcient is
insigniﬁcant, albeit negative, in sectors where economies of scale are important (columns 7 and 8).
We do not report the results of running sample splits for process innovation (available upon request).
For process innovation we obtain patterns that are in all respects very similar to those obtained for
product innovation, but the coeﬃcient estimates are insigniﬁcant. Finally, in columns 9 and 10, we
display the results for ﬁrms that are part of a group. Concentration has a negative and signiﬁcant
impact (z = -1.69), with a coeﬃcient equal to -2.872, for ﬁrms aﬃliated to a group. This result
could suggest that the aﬃliation to a group increases the gap between large shareholders’ cash ﬂow
rights and their control rights and, hence, exacerbates the risk that large shareholders expropriate the
beneﬁts of innovation.22
6.3 Shocks to Ownership Structure
It is possible that not only the current ownership structure aﬀects a ﬁrm’s decision to innovate, but
also that changes in the ownership structure have a role in innovation choices. Two questions in the
survey may help us capture these “dynamic” eﬀects. First, the survey asks whether the ﬁrm has issued
new equity over the three years ending in the year of the survey. In addition to this, it asks about
the nature of the outside investors that underwrote the new shares (ﬁnancial institutions or other
subscribers). The percentage of ﬁrms with new subscribers is 2.1% and 1% have ﬁnancial institutions
as new subscribers. In Table 8 (columns 1-4), we report the regressions where we add a dummy equal
to one if a ﬁnancial institution subscribed shares, zero otherwise. We treat this dummy as endogenous
and instrument it using the same variables that we use for ownership concentration.23 In the linear
probability model, we address the endogeneity issue by two-stage least squares and in the ﬁrst stage we
estimate a linear probability model for the dummy.24 In the non-linear probability (probit) model for
innovation, we address the issue of endogeneity of the dummy by a two-step method based on a least
22Instead, the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant, albeit negative, for ﬁrms aﬃliated to a consortium.
23Our choice is justiﬁed by the fact that where the local credit market is more developed, banks may have more
money and information about ﬁrms to subscribe new equity shares.
24Angrist and Pischke (2009) consider the issue of estimation when a dichotomous regressor is endogenous and suggest
to instrument it with the ﬁtted probability from a ﬁrst stage probit reduced form model for the endogenous dummy.
However, this procedure presents diﬃculties when there is more than one endogenous variable and the endogenous
variables share the same instruments, which is our case when we add to the regression the main shareholder’ equity
share.
17square approximation as proposed by Arendt and Holm (2006). This procedure consists of estimating
ﬁrst a linear probability model for the endogenous dummy, computing the residual and then performing
a probit estimation for innovation adding the ﬁtted residual as an additional covariate.25 In the tables
we label the columns reporting the estimates based on this procedure as “augmented model”. The
dummy for ﬁnancial institution subscribing shares has a signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient in the
model for product innovation, whether we control or not for ownership concentration.26 The eﬀect of
this dummy on process innovation is similar.
The second relevant survey question regards the intention of the ﬁrm to go public in the following
year. Less than 2% of the ﬁrms declare such an intention. In the last four columns of Table 8, we
report the regressions with a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm plans to go public, zero otherwise. Like
before, we treat the dummy as endogenous and either instrument it with its ﬁtted probability in the
linear probability model or estimate a “residual augmented” non-linear probability (probit) model, as
detailed above.27 The coeﬃcient of the dummy for the intention to go public is positive and signiﬁcant
for both product and process innovation. These ﬁndings are consistent with our priors. In fact, going
public means diluting the cash ﬂow rights of the main shareholder. Finally, in untabulated regressions,
we veriﬁed whether acquisitions and divestitures have any eﬀect on innovation. The results suggest
that such events do not play a role.
6.4 Innovative and Traditional Investments
The reader may wonder whether the negative eﬀect of ownership concentration on innovation simply
reﬂects a broader negative eﬀect of concentration on total investment (traditional or innovative). In
Table 9, we present two regressions that test whether ownership concentration has a role in explaining
the likelihood and the amount of ﬁrms’ total investment. To this end we use the following survey
question: “In the last three years did the ﬁrm carry out investment for purchasing plants or equipment,
and, if so, for what amount in each year?”. Thus, we deﬁne a binary variable that takes the value of
one if the ﬁrm invested, zero otherwise; and a variable equal to the average investment expenditures
over the three years. In our sample 85 percent of ﬁrms reported some investment. There is a positive
and large correlation between the decision to carry out some investment and innovation activity: for
product (process) or related organizational innovation the pairwise correlation coeﬃcient is 10.2%
(25.7%).
For convenience, in columns 1 through 4 of the table, we carry over the basic results from Table
4 for the propensity to innovate. In columns 5 and 6, we report the estimates for the propensity to
invest. Instead, in the regression in column 7, the left hand side variable is the average investment
expenditure. The estimates suggest that, in contrast to innovation decisions, ownership concentration
does not matter for ﬁrms’ investment decisions as the coeﬃcients in the regressions for investment
are small and insigniﬁcant.28 These results would imply that the eﬀects of the ownership structure
are speciﬁc to innovation. For example, they could be related to risk aversion (due to a lack of
25This procedure is a simple alternative to maximum likelihood estimation. It is computationally less demanding and
always converges. Arendt and Holm (2006) conduct Monte Carlo exercises to evaluate the bias of this approximation
in diﬀerent settings and ﬁnd that this procedure works well and overall performs as well as full maximum likelihood
estimation in small samples when there is a “degree of endogeneity” not too severe.
26When we control for ownership concentration in the non-linear probability model, we estimate the coeﬃcients of
interest by running AGLS on the “residual augmented” model.
27As instruments for the dummy for “intention to go public”, we use the variables used for ownership concentration
(see the note to the table for the exact list). The rationale for using these instruments is that tighter restrictions in the
local credit market may force ﬁrms to search alternative sources of ﬁnancing and induce them to go public.
28In these regressions we include in our set of instruments Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) measure of external ﬁnancial
dependence. Removing these instruments left the results for total investment essentially unchanged.
18diversiﬁcation) or to conﬂicts of interest between large and minority shareholders that are detrimental
to innovation, but not to traditional investments.
7 Disentangling the Link Ownership-Innovation
In the analysis so far, we have not tried to identify the mechanisms through which ﬁrms’ ownership
structure aﬀects innovation decisions. We now turn to explore this issue. As discussed in Section 4,
there are two main reasons why concentrated shareholding can hinder technical change: incentives of
large shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders and large shareholders’ lack of diversiﬁcation
and consequent risk aversion. In Tables 10 and 11, we try to assess the contribution of these two
mechanisms.
7.1 Agency Problems
In Table 10, we explore how the possible expropriation of minority stakeholders by large ones may
inﬂuence innovation choices. We develop two tests. First, we examine whether the presence of
external managers in the ﬁrm’s board of directors aﬀects the likelihood of innovation. As suggested
by Anderson and Reeb (2003) for family-led ﬁrms (which represent 75% of our sample), one can
expect that whenever a ﬁrm resorts to managers outside the controlling family, the conﬂicts of interest
between large and minority shareholders are milder. In fact, the inﬂuence of independent directors may
represent an important line of defense that minority shareholders can employ to protect themselves
against the opportunism of large shareholders. Moreover, family members might view the health of
the family ﬁrm as an extension of their own well-being (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri,
2003). Acting as stewards, families might thus include in the board external managers who carry a
speciﬁc expertise or can act as advocates for corporate health and viability. The last two waves of
the Capitalia survey ask each ﬁrm the percentage of external managers in the board of the ﬁrm. In
columns 1-4 of Table 10, we restrict the analysis to these two waves and control for the impact that the
share of outside managers has on innovation.29 We treat this variable as endogenous and instrument
it using the variables reﬂecting the constrictiveness of the 1936 banking regulation in Italy.30 We ﬁnd
that the likelihood of product and process innovation increase with the share of external managers: the
coeﬃcients of the percentage of external managers are equal to 1.784 and 2.177 and signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Results are robust to inserting the equity share held by the main owner. This corroborates
the idea that having outside managers increases the likelihood of innovation, mitigating any conﬂicts
of interest among shareholders.
In our second test we account for whether the main shareholder reports to have control over
the ﬁrm. The rationale for this test is that control over the ﬁrm reduces the divergence between
cash-ﬂow rights and control rights. Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) suggest that separating
control rights from cash-ﬂow rights increases agency costs (in particular it can distort the incentives
of corporate controllers to make eﬃcient decisions with respect to project selection). Grossman and
Hart (1988) show that separating ownership and control can lower shareholders’ value. Claessens,
Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) argue that the agency problems of entrenchment and value extraction
29The rate of response to this question is low, around 40 percent of the sample. Hence, the number of observations
of these regressions is relatively small.
30The (eﬃciency of the) credit market can aﬀect both the demand and the supply of managers. On the demand side,
limited credit availability can hinder the ability of ﬁrms to pay the (possibly high) salaries of outside managers and
induce ﬁrms to rely mostly on competencies inside the family. On the supply side, it is widely agreed that the credit
market impacts individuals’ ability to invest in human capital and, hence, can inﬂuence the formation of managerial
capital.
19are especially important when there is a large divergence between control rights and cash-ﬂow rights,
because the willingness to extract value is less restrained by the controlling shareholder’s cash-ﬂow
stake. In columns 5-6, we include a dummy for whether the main shareholder has control over the ﬁrm
and ﬁnd that a main shareholder with control over the ﬁrm promotes innovation (2SLS coeﬃcient
equal to 1.217). This suggests that aligning control rights and cash ﬂow rights fosters innovation,
although the coeﬃcient on the dummy tends to lose signiﬁcance when we control for concentration
(columns 7-8).31
7.2 Risk and (Lack of) Diversiﬁcation
In Table 11, we explore the role of risk and diversiﬁcation in the innovation process. In columns 1-2,
we interact our measure of ownership concentration with an (inverse) measure of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
diversiﬁcation. If the ﬁnancial portfolio of a ﬁrm is not diversiﬁed, large investors could be reluctant
to undertake risky innovations (Bolton and von Thadden, 1998). Our measure of diversiﬁcation is
based on a question asking ﬁrms about the allocation of their ﬁnancial investments among equity par-
ticipation in Italian companies, equity participation in foreign companies, short-term Italian bonds,
medium- and long-term Italian bonds, foreign bonds, other ﬁnancial instruments. The rate of re-
sponse to this question is about 35%. We compute the concentration of the ﬁnancial portfolio as the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index of the various asset shares.32 The coeﬃcient of the interaction between
this index and our measure of ownership concentration is negative and signiﬁcant both in the regres-
sion for product innovation and in that for process innovation. Furthermore, once we include this
interaction, the coeﬃcient on the capital share becomes insigniﬁcant also in the regression for product
innovation. Hence, the negative eﬀect of ownership concentration on innovation depends on the degree
of ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation of the ﬁrm: the less diversiﬁed a ﬁrm is, the lower its propensity to inno-
vate if its ownership is relatively more concentrated. In columns 3 and 4, we use a diﬀerent measure
of ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation (following Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Plausibly, the higher the number of
industries in which a ﬁrm is active, the more diversiﬁed its production will be. We thus code dummy
variables for whether the ﬁrm is classiﬁed in a three-, four-, or ﬁve-digit ATECO sector and interact
the equity share of the main shareholder with the ﬁve-digit ATECO dummy, which indicates a case
of low diversiﬁcation. The results conﬁrm the role of diversiﬁcation: for product innovation, the coef-
ﬁcient on this interaction variable is negative (coeﬃcient equal to -0.148) and statistically signiﬁcant
(z = -2.085). Overall, diversiﬁcation (whether ﬁnancial or industrial) appears to spur innovation.
Next, we break the innovation process into phases to understand at what stage of innovation
corporate governance is most relevant. Broadly speaking, the innovation process comprises two phases:
the research phase and the phase of introduction or adoption of new technologies. Based on our
theoretical prior, it seems plausible that the technological conservatism due to the risk aversion of
non-diversiﬁed shareholders is more relevant in the riskier phase, that is, the research phase. We
proceed in two steps to disentangle the eﬀects of corporate governance on research and on technology
31In the estimation, we treat the dummy for “main shareholder with control” as endogenous and address the endo-
geneity issue as we did with the proxies for the shocks to ownership structure. See Section 6.3 for details about the
procedure and the note to the table for the list of instruments used, which are drawn from the same set of variables
that we use for ownership concentration. It is plausible that the conditions in the local ﬁnancial market aﬀect both
the shares of a ﬁrm held by equity-holders and their level of involvement in the ﬁrm (that is, whether they have the
incentive to control the ﬁrm).
32Firms’ ﬁnancial portfolio composition is in principle endogenous to innovation decisions. Hence, we instrument it
and use the same instrumental variables that we use for ownership concentration. The conditions of the local credit
market can aﬀect a ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial portfolio diversiﬁcation in two ways: through the information that the local banks
are able to provide to the ﬁrms and through the incentives for ﬁrms to hold deposits in banks.
20adoption. First, we investigate whether the ownership concentration aﬀects R&D decisions; then,
we explore whether it aﬀects investment in information technology.33 Investment in information
technology appears to be a good proxy for the adoption of innovations. In fact, information technology
is an area in which most manufacturing ﬁrms do not invent new hardware, software, or communication
equipment but acquire them from ICT ﬁrms, research centers, and universities (Conﬁndustria, 2007).
To appraise the eﬀect of ownership concentration on R&D, we use the following survey question:
“In the last three years, did the ﬁrm carry out any R&D expenditures?”. We then construct a binary
variable that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm has carried out R&D, zero otherwise, and regress it on
our measure of ownership concentration. Results are in column 5 of Table 11. The eﬀect of the capital
share held by the main shareholder on the R&D decision of the ﬁrm is negative and signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. The eﬀect of ownership concentration on R&D is economically sizable, especially when
compared to the impact of control variables such as ﬁrm characteristics or local economic conditions.
To verify whether ownership concentration matters for the introduction of new technologies, we
use the following survey question: “In the last three years did the ﬁrm carry out investment for the
introduction of hardware, software, telecommunication networks?”. We deﬁne a binary variable that
takes the value of one if the ﬁrm has carried out this type of investment (76% of ﬁrms did), zero
otherwise, and regress it on our measure of ownership concentration. Results are reported in column
6. The coeﬃcients of the equity share are negative, but small and not signiﬁcant. In addition to
these regressions, we carry out two additional tests on the adoption of innovations. The ﬁrst test
(column 7) regards patenting activity. The survey reports whether a ﬁrm acquired or sold a patent
abroad. We consider the acquisition of patents: about 2% of the ﬁrms acquired patents abroad in the
years of the survey. The estimated eﬀect of ownership concentration on patent acquisition is positive,
large (coeﬃcient equal to 5.791) and signiﬁcant (z = 2.13). The second test (column 8) considers
the natural logarithm of expenditures for technological innovation that not are directly spent in R&D
(e.g., acquisitions of plants, know how, training and marketing of innovative products).34 On average,
the ﬁrms spend 56% of their total budget for innovation on these items. The eﬀect of concentration
is negative (-2.521) but not signiﬁcant. In sum, the results that we obtain breaking the innovation
process in separate phases suggest that ownership concentration discourages internal research more
than the adoption of innovations. In fact, the eﬀect of ownership concentration on the adoption of
innovations is ambiguous (or even positive in the case of patent acquisitions). As discussed above, this
is consistent with the hypothesis that one of the reasons for which ownership concentration impacts
technological change is shareholders’ risk aversion.
Finally, in columns 9-10, we allow for diﬀerent legal types of the businesses by inserting a dummy
that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm is a corporation, that is, a private limited company (LTD;
about 57 percent of the ﬁrms in the sample) or a public limited company (PLC; 39 percent of the
ﬁrms). We obtained information on the legal type of the businesses (not reported in some of the
survey waves), from ﬁrms’ web-sites and then hand-matched this information with the surveys using
the VAT identiﬁcation number. Inside corporations, shareholders are protected by limited liability, so
they might be less averse to risky ventures such as innovations. The results conﬁrm this hypothesis:
the coeﬃcient on the “corporation” dummy is positive and signiﬁcant (at the 10% level). The reader
could however suspect that this positive eﬀect on innovation is picking up the eﬀect of dispersed
ownership (in fact, corporations tend to have a more dispersed ownership structure). To assuage
this concern, we add to the regression the share of the main owner (columns 11-12). The results
33There is rich anecdotal evidence that in the period under scrutiny Italian ﬁrms allocated a relevant share of their
expenditures for innovation to the introduction of new information technology.
34This information is available only in the last two waves of the Capitalia survey. Thus, we restrict this regression to
the last waves.
21suggest that the incorporation of the ﬁrm has an eﬀect on innovation on top of the eﬀect of ownership
concentration. In particular, although the evidence regarding the “corporation” dummy is mixed for
product innovation, the coeﬃcient is always positive and signiﬁcant for process innovation.
8 Do Family Firms Innovate More or Less?
In the regressions in Table 12, we allow for diﬀerences in the type of owner by adding, in separate
regressions, a dummy for “family business”, when the main shareholder is an individual or family
(77 percent of ﬁrms in the sample), and a dummy for bank or ﬁnancial institution (10 percent of the
sample). The remaining 13 percent of ﬁrms have another manufacturing ﬁrm or holding company
as the main shareholder. The owner type dummy is treated as endogenous and instrumented using
the same variables used for ownership concentration.35 With the “family business” dummy, we also
experiment by adding to the set of instruments an index of ﬁnancial awareness similar to that in
Guiso and Jappelli (2005). This index is based on the Bank of Italy Surveys of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) and is computed (at the regional level) as the fraction of Italian households that are
aware of the existence of basic ﬁnancial instruments such as stocks and mutual funds. The rationale for
using this instrument is that where there is better awareness of the functioning of ﬁnancial markets,
individual competence and skills to run a business might be more far-reaching and individuals more
prone to run their ﬁrm and retain a larger stake in it. By contrast, ﬁnancial awareness should not
impact ﬁrms’ innovation decisions directly, also in view of the fact that our index is an average at
the regional level and is based on household survey data dating back to 1995. Results do not change
when we use this additional instrument.
The evidence for family ﬁrms is reported in columns 1-4 for product innovation and 8-10 for process
innovation. Based on our analysis, family ﬁrms are more likely to carry out product innovations than
ﬁrms whose main shareholder is a ﬁnancial institution or another manufacturing ﬁrm. In contrast,
they are less likely to carry out process innovation, unless ownership concentration is suﬃciently high,
in which case family ﬁrms are also relatively more likely to carry out process innovation. A possible
interpretation for the positive eﬀect of family ownership on innovation is long-termism (Lehmann and
Weigand, 2000). A more stable ownership structure, typical of family ﬁrms, may mitigate managerial
myopia. In fact, since the company will be passed to future generations of family members, current
owners will be long-term value maximizers and have longer investment horizons (Anderson and Reeb,
2003). As discussed earlier, both these aspects are particularly beneﬁcial for investments in R&D
and new technologies, because such investments entail long gestation periods. Regarding ownership
by ﬁnancial institutions (columns 5-7 for product innovation, 11-13 for process innovation), we ﬁnd
that it has a negative but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on product innovation. The ﬁndings are similar when we
control for concentration, while when we interact concentration with the ﬁnancial institution dummy,
we obtain that the likelihood of engaging in product innovation increases with concentration. In
particular, the eﬀect of institutional ownership becomes positive when the equity share of the main
owner exceeds 70%.
Collectively, these results suggest that family businesses are more likely to innovate than ﬁrms
owned by ﬁnancial institutions, but institutional ownership has a positive eﬀect on innovation when
35As instruments (listed in the note to the table) we use the variables that capture the constrictiveness of the credit
market regulation in 1936. Their use for owner type variables can be justiﬁed on the basis of the same arguments
used for shareholders’ equity share. Indeed, ﬁrms’ owner type is likely to reﬂect the same needs and incentives to
open participation to new shareholders and go public as the degree of ownership concentration. As for the econometric
procedure, we use 2SLS when considering the linear probability model and estimate a residual-augmented model when
considering the probit speciﬁcation, as described in Section 6.3.
22the equity share owned by the ﬁnancial institution, and hence the inﬂuence of the institution, is large
enough. This is in line with the results of Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2009) who ﬁnd evidence
of a positive association between innovation and institutional ownership concentration. As discussed
in Section 4, a possible explanation for this result is managers’ laziness. In fact, managers may prefer
a quiet life, but institutional investors could force them to innovate. An alternative explanation is
based on issues of career concerns. Innovation carries a risk for the CEO, and this generates a natural
aversion to innovation. For this reason, increased monitoring, provided by institutional owners, can
improve incentives to innovate by insulating managers from the reputational consequences of bad
income realizations. This way, institutional ownership concentration may encourage innovation.
9 Conclusion
This paper has built on the hypothesis that the ownership structure of a ﬁrm impacts its innovation
eﬀort. We have found that, after accounting for its possible endogeneity, ownership concentration has
a large, negative eﬀect on product innovation. This result is robust to using alternative instrument
sets, and to controlling for a variety of ﬁrm attributes and local conditions that may also inﬂuence
innovation. Furthermore, the negative eﬀect of ownership concentration appears to be stronger for
medium-sized and large ﬁrms and for ﬁrms operating in traditional sectors. We have tried to disen-
tangle the channels whereby ownership concentration may be an obstacle to innovation. The results
suggest that risk aversion induced by lack of ﬁnancial and industrial diversiﬁcation renders large
shareholders reluctant to innovate. Consistent with this ﬁnding, ownership concentration appears to
depress especially ﬁrms’ R&D eﬀort, allegedly the riskiest phase of the innovation process. In addi-
tion, the analysis reveals that conﬂicts of interest between large and minority shareholders may hinder
technological change when ownership is concentrated.
In the last part of the paper, we have carried out additional tests to examine whether the nature
of the main shareholder plays a role in innovation decisions. We have found that ﬁrms led by a family
are more likely to innovate than ﬁrms led by ﬁnancial institutions, but, importantly, the beneﬁts of
ﬁnancial institutions for innovation increase with their equity stake in the company. Interestingly, we
have also uncovered evidence that attributing control to the main shareholder has a positive eﬀect on
product innovation, which is in line with the idea that aligning cash ﬂow rights with control rights
mitigates agency problems inside ﬁrms.
We believe that the analysis represents a ﬁrst step in a potentially fruitful line of research. Techno-
logical change is one of the major mechanisms through which ﬁrms grow, expand abroad, and acquire
market shares. Our analysis suggests that, by inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ innovation decisions, corporate gov-
ernance can be a driving force of these processes.
Appendix
Four main data sources are used in the empirical analysis: four waves of the Capitalia Survey of Italian
Manufacturing Firms (SIMF), which cover three-year periods ending respectively in 1997, 2000, 2003
and 2006; the province-level database of the Italian National Statistics Oﬃce (ISTAT); the Statistical
Bulletin of the Bank of Italy (SBBI); and the book “Struttura funzionale e territoriale del sistema
bancario italiano 1936-1974”(SFT) by the Bank of Italy. The variables used in the empirical analysis
are:
Product innovation and process innovation: The survey asks each ﬁrm: “In the last three
years, did the ﬁrm realize: 1) product innovations, 2) process innovations, 3) organizational innovations
related to product innovations, 4) organizational innovations related to process innovations?”. The
23dummy for product innovation takes the value of one if the ﬁrm reports to have realized product
innovations or organizational innovations related to product innovations over the three years covered
by the survey (zero otherwise). The dummy for process innovation takes the value of one if the ﬁrm
reports to have realized process innovations or organizational innovations related to process innovations
(zero otherwise). (SIMF)
Investment in R&D: The survey asks each ﬁrm: “In the last three years, did the ﬁrm carry
out R&D expenditures?”. The dummy for R&D investment takes the value of one if the ﬁrm answers
“yes”, zero otherwise. (SIMF)
Information technology: The survey asks each ﬁrm: “In the last three years, did the ﬁrm
carry out investment for the introduction of hardware, software, telecommunication networks?”. The
dummy for information technology takes the value of one if the ﬁrm answers “yes”, zero otherwise.
(SIMF)
Business type: The survey asks each ﬁrm whether it is publicly listed. The information on
whether the ﬁrm is a private limited company (LTD) or a public limited company (PLCs) is available
only for the 2003 and 2006 surveys. For the other years, the information, which is publicly available
on ﬁrms’ web-sites, has been imputed by hand based on the VAT identiﬁcation number. (SIMF)
Owner information: The survey asks each ﬁrm to report the characteristics of the shareholders
owning and/or controlling the ﬁrm, listed from the largest shareholder to the third largest. The
information in the survey can be tabulated as follows:
Subject Type* Capital Has direct control Is part of shareholder




* Reports: 1. if residing abroad; 2. Italian person; 3. Italian private manufacturing company or ﬁrm; 4.
Italian public manufacturing company or ﬁrm; 5. Italian private “holding” company or ﬁrm; 6. Italian public
“holding” company or ﬁrm; 7. bank or ﬁnancial institution.
Bank branches in 1936: Number of bank branches in the year 1936 in the province, per 1,000
inhabitants. (SFT)
Local/National banks in 1936: Ratio of local to national bank branches in the year 1936 in
the province. (SFT)
Cooperatives banks in 1936: Number of cooperative banks in the year 1936 in the province,
per 1,000 inhabitants. (SFT)
Saving banks in 1936: Number of savings banks in the year 1936 in the province, per 1,000
inhabitants. (SFT)
New branches entrant: For each province and year we calculate the number of branches created
by entrant banks per 1000 inhabitants. Then we computed the average over the years 1991-1998.
(SBBI)
New branches incumbent: For each province and year we calculated the number of branches
created minus those closed by incumbent banks per 1,000 inhabitants. Then we computed the average
over the years 1991-1998. (SBBI)
Financial dependence: We use the measures proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ce-
torelli and Strahan (2006). These measures are based on the same methodology and consist of the
proportion of capital expenditures ﬁnanced with external funds for the median Compustat ﬁrm in
each industrial sector over a number of years. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) use data over the 1980 to
1997 period and classify ﬁrms based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes. Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998) use data from the 1980s only and classify ﬁrms based on three- or four-digit
International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC). We impute these measures using the two-,
three- or four-digit ATECO industry codes.
Financial awareness: We use the weighted indicator of ﬁnancial awareness of Italian families
proposed by Guiso and Jappelli (2005). This indicator is based on the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The survey collects detailed information on wealth and
socioeconomic variables. Before asking if household members own any particular asset, and how
much, the survey elicits data on ﬁnancial awareness. Each household head reports whether he or she
is aware of the existence of ﬁnancial assets. This indicator is the number of assets that each individual
knows about divided by the number of potential assets known (14 in all). To obtain our measure we
24weight less popular assets (such as checking accounts) than assets that are less widely known (such as
corporate bonds and mutual funds). In practice, we weight the index by the inverse of the proportion
of people aware of the asset, and scale it by the sum of the weights.
Group, Consortium: The survey asks each ﬁrm to report whether it belongs to a group of ﬁrms
and whether it belongs to a consortium. The dummies for participation in a group and consortium
take the value of one if the ﬁrm answers “yes”to the questions, zero otherwise. (SIMF)
Sector of activity: The survey reports the sector of activity of ﬁrms (ATECO code). Based on
this information, ﬁrms are classiﬁed as traditional, high tech and scale intensive using Pavitt’s tax-
onomy. Traditional sectors include, among others, apparel and textiles, food and beverages, tobacco
and leather. High tech ﬁrms include producers of electric and electronic equipment, medical and
orthopedic supplies, pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, among others. Scale intensive ﬁrms
include producers of paper and allied products, petroleum and coal, stone, clay, glass and concrete
products, among others. (SIMF)
Number of banks, Duration relationship with main bank: The survey asks each ﬁrm to
report the number of banks with which it maintains a stable credit relationship and the duration (in
years) of the relationship with the main lender, at the time of interview. (SIMF)
Credit rationing: Our measures of credit rationing are based on ﬁrms’ response to the following
question in the survey: “In 2000, would the ﬁrm have liked to obtain more credit at the market
interest rate?”. The dummy for credit rationing takes the value of one if the ﬁrm answers “yes”, zero
otherwise. (SIMF)
Age: Number of years since inception. (SIMF)
Total assets, sales and inventories are balance sheet data. They are available for each year
covered by the survey. We use the three-year average. (SIMF)
Center: Dummy that takes the value of one if ﬁrm is located in a central province; zero otherwise.
(SIMF)
South: Dummy that takes the value of one if ﬁrm is located in a southern province; zero otherwise.
(SIMF)
Provincial GDP growth: Average growth rate of the value added of the province where the
ﬁrm is located over the years 1985-1994. (SBBI)
Number of branches: For each province and year we calculated the number of branches per
1,000 inhabitants; then we computed the average over the years 1991-1998. (SBBI)
Herﬁndahl: Average Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) on bank loans in the province during
the 1985-1995 period. (SBBI)
Local ﬁnancial development: We use the measure proposed by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2004). This is based on the estimates of the ﬁxed eﬀects for geographical region from a probit for
the probability that, ceteris paribus, a household is shut oﬀ from the credit market in Italy.
Eﬃciency of the court system: We follow the methodology of Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano
(2005). We considered the number of civil suits pending in each of the 27 district courts of Italy, scaled
by the population of the district. We imputed this variable to the ﬁrms according to the districts
where they are headquartered. (ISTAT)
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Table 1. Sample summary statistics 
  Full sample  Product innov.  No prod. innov.  Process innov.  No proc. Innov.  R&D invest.  No R&D. 
invest. 
Dependent Variables               
Product innovation*  0.388  1.000  0.000  0.511  0.257  0.607  0.225 
Process innovation*  0.512  0.679  0.411  1.000  0.000  0.660  0.406 
R&D investment*  0.426  0.668  0.274  0.547  0.299  1.000  0.000 
Information technology*  0.764  0.817  0.725  0.804  0.713  0.835  0.703 
Endogenous Variables               
Main shareholder quota  0.572  0.598  0.554  0.579  0.565  0.596  0.552 
  (0.281)  (0.286)  (0.276)  (0.282)  (0.279)  (0.285)  (0.275) 
Main s.holder has control  0.699  0.671  0.721  0.673  0.726  0.657  0.734 
  (0.458)  (0.469)  (0.448)  (0.469)  (0.446)  (0.474)  (0.441) 
Two main s.holder quota  0.809  0.826  0.797  0.810  0.807  0.820  0.800 
  (0.232)  (0.222)  (0.238)  (0.231)  (0.233)  (0.224)  (0.238) 
Three main s. holder quota  0.912  0.923  0.906  0.912  0.913  0.920  0.907 
  (0.175)  (0.159)  (0.184)  (0.175)  (0.174)  (0.162)  (0.183) 
Private limited company*  0.568  0.502  0.613  0.522  0.616  0.486  0.632 
Public limited company*  0.366  0.443  0.313  0.410  0.319  0.466  0.287 
Listed firm*  0.012  0.017  0.008  0.015  0.009  0.019  0.006 
Main s.hold. is a family/single person*  0.749  0.715  0.774  0.723  0.775  0.696  0.793 
Main s.hold. is a financial institution*  0.094  0.126  0.075  0.113  0.075  0.131  0.068 
Main s.hold. is a firm or holding*  0.118  0.119  0.116  0.131  0.104  0.134  0.105 
Control Variables               
Member of a group*  0.240  0.288  0.203  0.277  0.201  0.310  0.181 
Member of a consortium*  0.087  0.096  0.082  0.097  0.078  0.097  0.080 
‘Traditional’ sector*  0.486  0.434  0.522  0.455  0.519  0.423  0.536 
High tech*  0.047  0.059  0.039  0.054  0.039  0.067  0.032 
No. banks  5.594  6.222  5.204  6.115  5.049  6.446  4.974 
  (5.023)  (4.756)  (5.147)  (5.883)  (3.855)  (4.870)  (5.055) 
Length relation main bank  16.766  16.783  16.771  16.742  16.798  17.095  16.531 
  (12.223)  (12.084)  (12.314)  (12.392)  (12.039)  (12.547)  (11.986) 
Credit Rationing*  0.134  0.131  0.135  0.130  0.137  0.125  0.140 
Age  24.304  25.567  23.510  24.803  23.788  25.958  23.074 
  (17.670)  (17.576)  (17.663)  (18.079)  (17.226)  (18.320)  (17.018) 
No. Employees  105.449  141.952  73.859  131.223  77.735  152.063  62.030 
  (354.115)  (434.551)  (250.186)  (401.598)  (292.107)  (427.347)  (242.254) 
Total assets (100.000 €)  262.902  344.090  169.516  329.743  194.184  364.944  140.180 
  (132.684)  (155.152)  (85.368)  (153.656)  (106.902)  (152.625)  (81.422) 
Sales (100.000 €)  242.500  308.773  174.109  283.463  198.377  342.057  141.034 
  (121.169)  (128.338)  (105.024)  (121.634)  (120.666)  (144.653)  (85.623) 
Located in the North*  0.683  0.720  0.660  0.694  0.673  0.724  0.653 
Located in the Center*  0.208  0.195  0.216  0.204  0.212  0.204  0.212 
Located in the South*  0.108  0.085  0.124  0.102  0.115  0.072  0.136 
No. branches, 91-98  0.462  0.470  0.457  0.465  0.460  0.472  0.456 
  (0.112)  (0.108)  (0.114)  (0.111)  (0.112)  (0.106)  (0.116) 
Provincial GDP growth, 85-94  0.085  0.085  0.084  0.085  0.084  0.085  0.084 
  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
Provincial Herfindahl, 85-95  0.066  0.065  0.067  0.066  0.066  0.064  0.067 
  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.029) 
Local financial development  0.349  0.358  0.345  0.352  0.348  0.360  0.342 
  (0.113)  (0.105)  (0.117)  (0.111)  (0.115)  (0.104)  (0.119) 
Pending trials, 91-98  0.004  0.003  (0.004  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Instrumental Variables               
Bank branches in 1936  20.938  21.253  20.750  21.132  20.743  21.388  20.626 
  (8.537)  (8.477)  (8.580)  (8.671)  (8.392)  (8.468)  (8.592) 
Local/National banks in 1936  0.809  0.821  0.802  0.812  0.806  0.820  0.802 
  (0.172)  (0.167)  (0.175)  (0.171)  (0.173)  (0.166)  (0.176) 
Cooperatives banks in 1936  0.698  0.696  0.700  0.688  0.709  0.693  0.702 
  (0.498)  (0.489)  (0.505)  (0.493)  (0.505)  (0.492)  (0.503) 
Savings banks in 1936  0.251  0.257  0.247  0.251  0.251  0.262  0.243 
  (0.344)  (0.353)  (0.338)  (0.349)  (0.3407)  (0.351)  (0.338) 
New branches (by entrants), 91-98  2.422  2.458  2.390  2.433  2.409  2.444  2.397 
  (2.269)  (2.293)  (2.244)  (2.275)  (2.260)  (2.276)  (2.254) 
New branches (by incumb.), 91-98  23.830  24.417  23.341  24.052  23.582  24.386  23.299 
  (25.013)  (25.365)  (24.667)  (25.086)  (24.912)  (25.309)  (24.663) 
Cetorelli and Strahan measure  0.365  0.400  0.343  0.379  0.350  0.405  0.335 
   of financial dependence  (0.257)  (0.246)  (0.262)  (0.248)  (0.265)  (0.249)  (0.260) 
Guiso and Jappelli index of  0.699  0.716  0.688  0.704  0.694  0.715  0.686 
   financial awareness of households  (0.284)  (0.282)  (0.286)  (0.285)  (0.284)  (0.278)  (0.288) 
Observations  18603  7035  11117  9350  8927  7740  10411 
Note: See the appendix for exact definitions. Means and (in parenthesis) standard deviations. * denotes a dummy variable.   31 
Table 2. Ownership concentration and innovation. OLS and Probit regressions 
Panel A: OLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC 
Main s.holder   0.071***      0.021     
Quota  (0.016)      (0.016)     
             
Two main     0.072***      0.012   
s.holder quota    (0.018)      (0.019)   
             
Three main       0.071***      0.014 
s.holder quota      (0.024)      (0.026) 
             
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
             
Obs.  12113  12064  12028  12130  12081  12045 
R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.06  0.06 
Panel B: Probit 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
   I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC 
Main s.holder   0.185***      0.041      
Quota  (0.043)      (0.043)      
             
Two main     0.198***      0.027    
s.holder quota    (0.053)      (0.051)    
             
Three main       0.209***      0.036 
s.holder quota      (0.071)      (0.068) 
               
T. dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
A. dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
               
Obs.  12113  12064  12028  12130  12081  12045 
R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables are reported at the top of 
each column. Main shareholder quota refers to the capital share held by the main shareholder. Two and three main shareholder quota refers to the 
capital share held by the two and three main shareholders. Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area in the 
country where the firm is headquartered (Center or South). The controls included are: a) firm characteristics, such as total assets, current assets, 
inventories, sales, a second-order polynomial in the age of the firm since founding, ATECO four- and five-digit code dummies, dummies for the 
sector of activity and duration of the credit relationship with the main bank; b) structural characteristics of the banking sector, such as the number 
of bank branches (per 100,000 inhabitants) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on bank loans, in the province; c) variables controlling for the 
characteristics of the environment where the firms operates, such as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) financial development index, provincial 
GDP growth and a measure of the efficiency of the court system; d) 24 sector dummies. For more information, exact definitions and details see 
the Appendix. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table reports the R
2 (OLS) and Pseudo R
2 (Probit).   32 
Table 3. The main shareholder quota and innovation. First stage of IV regressions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Product  Product  Prod – N.ban.    Prod – Cr. rat.  Process  Process 
  Main Shareholder quota 
Branches   0.001**  0.001***  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001*** 
in 1936  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0005) 
Local banks  -0.056**  -0.061***  -0.053**  -0.054***  -0.057**  -0.062*** 
/Nat. banks  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.023) 
Savings banks   -0.008  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  -0.007  -0.004 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
New branches  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.006*** 
(by entrants)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
External fin.    1.117        1.141 
dependence    (0.742)        (0.741) 
Instrum. interact. 
financ. depend. 
N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
             
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
             
R
2 excl. var.  0.0020  0.0036  0.0019  0.0018  0.0020  0.0037 
F statistics (Instr.)  5.78  4.99  5.98  5.58  5.83  5.02 
             
Observations  12113  12113  13257  12893  12130  12130 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables of the second stage are reported at 
the top of each column. The set of instruments includes: number of bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab.), the ratio of local to 
national bank branches, number of savings banks in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab.), branches opened by new entrants in the province over the 
1991-1998 period (net of closures). In col. (2) and (6) we add as instruments the measure of external financial dependence of Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), 
and the interaction between this measure and the other instruments (the coefficients of the interaction are not tabulated). Main shareholder quota refers to 
the capital share held by the main shareholder. Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area in the country where the firm 
is headquartered (Center or South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions in Table 2. In col. (3) instead of the duration of the credit 
relationship with the main bank, we use, as a control, the number of banking relationship. In column (4) instead of the duration of the credit relationship 
with the main bank, we use, as a control, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is credit rationed. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. The table reports the R
2 of the excluded instruments, and the value of the F statistics to test the weakness of the instruments.  
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Table 4. The main shareholder quota and innovation. Second stage of IV regressions 
 
  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b)  (5a)  (5b)  (6a)  (6b) 
  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS 
  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC 
Endogenous variable                         
Main s.holder quota  -1.076**  -2.852**  -0.502*  -1.406*  -0.992**  -2.643**  -1.132***  -3.029***  -0.158  -0.328  0.008  0.066 
   (0.422)  (1.148)  (0.271)  (0.761)  (0.404)  (1.102)  (0.437)  (1.186)  (0.362)  (0.946)  (0.266)  (0.701) 
Firms’ characteristics                         
Center  -0.029  -0.075  -0.007  -0.020  -0.033  -0.084  -0.032  -0.084  0.009  0.027  0.016  0.042 
   (0.022)  (0.060)  (0.017)  (0.046)  (0.022)  (0.059)  (0.023)  (0.062)  (0.019)  (0.049)  (0.016)  (0.043) 
South  -0.041  -0.114  -0.019  -0.059  -0.043  -0.115  -0.039  -0.107  -0.015  -0.042  -0.009  -0.027 
   (0.035)  (0.097)  (0.029)  (0.083)  (0.034)  (0.094)  (0.035)  (0.098)  (0.030)  (0.080)  (0.029)  (0.076) 
Tot. assets   0.038*  0.073*  0.028*  0.047  0.028*  0.060*  0.046***  0.100***  0.036***  0.146***  0.033***  0.139*** 
   (0.019)  (0.040)  (0.015)  (0.033)  (0.016)  (0.034)  (0.021)  (0.038)  (0.011)  (0.046)  (0.010)  (0.045) 
Current assets   -1.608***  -4.635***  -1.215***  -3.645***  -1.335***  -3.810***  -1.545***  -4.455***  -1.930***  -4.983***  -1.812***  -4.711*** 
/Tot. Assets  (0.441)  (1.217)  (0.345)  (0.976)  (0.417)  (1.147)  (0.458)  (1.248)  (0.386)  (1.005)  (0.344)  (0.903) 
Inventories  -0.031  0.542***  -0.016  0.584***  -0.034  0.321**  -0.044**  0.487***  -0.027  0.345**  -0.023  0.357** 
   (0.030)  (0.157)  (0.023)  (0.153)  (0.025)  (0.144)  (0.032)  (0.152)  (0.017)  (0.161)  (0.015)  (0.160) 
Sales   0.020  0.013  0.012  -0.008  0.020**  0.025  0.026  0.024  0.004  -0.052**  0.001  -0.057** 
   (0.015)  (0.029)  (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.032)  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.008)  (0.024) 
Age  0.003***  0.009***  0.003***  0.011***  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.004  0.002***  0.004**  0.002***  0.005*** 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000**  -0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ATECO 5 digits  -0.034**  -0.094*  -0.021  -0.060  0.025  -0.070  -0.038**  -0.103**  -0.019  -0.047  -0.016  -0.038 
   (0.017)  (0.048)  (0.014)  (0.040)  (0.016)  (0.045)  (0.017)  (0.048)  (0.015)  (0.040)  (0.014)  (0.037) 
ATECO 4 digits  -0.005  -0.011  0.001  0.001  0.006  0.017  -0.002  -0.003  -0.009  -0.019  -0.008  -0.015 
   (0.014)  (0.040)  (0.013)  (0.035)  (0.013)  (0.037)  (0.014)  (0.039)  (0.013)  (0.033)  (0.012)  (0.033) 
External fin. variables                         
Length rel. main  -0.063***  -0.173***  -0.045***  -0.128***          -0.018  -0.044  -0.013  -0.032 
bank  (0.015)  (0.041)  (0.011)  (0.030)          (0.013)  (0.033)  (0.010)  (0.027) 
No. banks          0.015***  0.038***             
           (0.001)  (0.004)             
Credit rationing              0.064***  0.175***         
              (0.015)  (0.043)         
Local market conditions                         
No. branch/100,000   0.142*  0.378*  0.120*  0.323*  0.100  0.278  0.154**  0.415**  0.138**  0.337**  0.132**  0.322** 
inhab. (91-98)  (0.072)  (0.196)  (0.063)  (0.172)  (0.067)  (0.181)  (0.072)  (0.194)  (0.062)  (0.162)  (0.061)  (0.160) 
Prov. GDP   -0.001  0.006  0.015  0.033  0.059  0.183  0.078  0.210  0.143  0.378  0.146  0.386 
growth  (85-94)  (0.112)  (0.307)  (0.097)  (0.272)  (0.103)  (0.287)  (0.109)  (0.301)  (0.097)  (0.254)  (0.096)  (0.253) 
Prov. HHI   -0.324  -0.875  -0.117  -0.332  -0.290  -0.789  -0.428  -1.179  0.102  0.300  0.162  0.441 
(85-95)  (0.276)  (0.768)  (0.221)  (0.638)  (0.265)  (0.743)  (0.279)  (0.783)  (0.241)  (0.626)  (0.222)  (0.582) 
Financ. develop.  -0.031  -0.085  0.003  0.004  -0.064  -0.175  -0.022  -0.059  -0.103  -0.266  -0.093  -0.243 
   (0.085)  (0.234)  (0.072)  (0.204)  (0.082)  (0.228)  (0.086)  (0.239)  (0.073)  (0.193)  (0.072)  (0.188) 
Pend. trials/100,000   -1.541  -4.924  -1.433  -4.460  -1.663  5.158  -1.429  -4.426  -0.356  -0.958  -0.326  -0.885 
inhab (98-00)  (1.108)  (3.350)  (0.967)  (2.991)  (1.051)  (3.172)  (1.109)  (3.336)  (0.998)  (2.701)  (0.994)  (2.689) 
                         
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                              
Overid. test (p-value)  0.9774    0.2715    0.9730    0.9983    0.0023    0.0132   
Wald test (p-value)    0.0017    0.0266    0.0026    0.0009    0.6965    0.9697 
                         
Observations  12113  12113  12113  12113  13257  13257  12893  12893  12130  12130  12130  12130 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables and the estimation method are reported at the top of each column. The set of instruments includes: number of 
bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab), the ratio of local to national bank branches, number of savings banks in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inahb), branches opened by new entrants in the province over 
the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). In col. (2a)-(2b) and (6a)-(6b) we add as instrument Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) measure of external financial dependence and the interaction between this measure and the other 
instruments (cfr. first-stage regressions in columns 2 and 6 of Table 3). Main shareholder quota refers to the capital share held by the main shareholder. Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area 
in the country where the firm is headquartered (Center or South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regression in Table 2. In col. (5) and (6), instead of the duration of the credit relationship with the main bank, we 
use, as a control, the number of banking relationship. In col. (7) and (8), instead of the duration of the credit relationship with the main bank, we use, as a control, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is credit rationed. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table reports the p-values of a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and of a Wald test of exogeneity of the variable that has been instrumented.   34 
Table 5. The effect of the two and three largest shareholders on innovation. IV regressions 
Panel A: First Stage Regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Product  Product  Process  Process 








Branches   0.001*  0.001*  0.001*  0.001* 
in 1936  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Local banks  -0.028  -0.001  -0.029  -0.001 
/Nat. banks  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Savings banks   -0.023**  -0.014**  -0.022**  -0.014* 
  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
New branches  0.002*  0.002  0.002*  0.002* 
(by entrants)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
         
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
         
R
2 excl. var.  0.0017  0.0010  0.0017  0.0010 
F statistics of instr.  4.78  2.75  4.73  2.69 
         
Observations  12064  12028  12081  12045 
 Panel B: 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROC 
Two main   -1.102**    -0.438   
s.holder quota  (0.532)    (0.490)   
         
Three main    -1.459    -0.156 
s.holder quota    (0.916)    (0.834) 
         
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
         
Overid. test   0.4786  0.2256  0.0049  0.0039 
(p-value)         
Observations  12064  12028  12081  12045 
 Panel C: AGLS 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROC 
Two main   -2.829**    -0.969   
s.holder quota  (1.438)    (1.267)   
         
Three main    -3.743    -0.110 
s.holder quota    (2.484)    (2.175) 
         
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
          
Wald test exog.  0.0171  0.0727  0.4249  0.9487 
(p-value)         
Observations  12064  12028  12081  12045 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables are reported at 
the top of each column. First-stage regressions are in Panel A; two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions are in Panel B; and Amemya’s 
generalized least square probit regressions are in Panel C. The set of instruments includes: number of bank branches in the province in 
1936 (per 100,000 inhab.), the ratio of local to national bank branches, number of savings banks in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 
inhab.), branches opened by new entrants in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). Two and three main shareholder 
quota refers to the capital share held by the two and three main shareholders. Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area 
dummies refer to the area in the country where the firm is headquartered (Center or South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of 
the regressions in Table 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. R
2 of the excluded instruments and value of 
the F-test on the instruments are reported. The table also reports the p-values of a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and of a 
Wald test of exogeneity for the variables that have been instrumented.   35 
Table 6. Robustness tests instrumenting the measures of external finance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC 
Main s.holder quota  -1.133**  -1.116*  -1.131***  0.127 
  (0.476)  (0.604)  (0.438)  (0.676) 
Length relation   0.116      -1.009 
with main bank  (0.561)      (0.794) 
No. banks    0.005     
     (0.033)     
Credit       -0.053   
rationing      (1.101)   
         
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
         
Overid. test   0.9588  0.9374  0.9887  0.1991 
(p-value)         
Wald test exog.         
(p-value)         
Observations  12113  13257  12893  12130 
Note: The table reports regression (second stage) coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). 
The dependent variables and the estimation method are reported at the top of each column. We instrument 
both  the  main shareholder quota and the variables proxying  for  external finance.  The set of instruments 
includes: number of bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab.), the ratio of local to national 
bank branches, number of savings banks in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab.), branches opened by 
new entrants in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). Time dummies denote the year of 
the survey. Area dummies refer to the area in the country where the firm is headquartered (Center or South). 
“+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions in Table 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. The table also reports the p-values of a Sargan test, as a test of overidentifying 
restrictions, and of a Wald test, as a test of exogeneity. 
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Table 7. Allowing for non-linear effects of ownership concentration on innovation 
Panel A: 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD 
      L<34  L³34  Traditional  High Tech  Scale  No scale  Group  Consortium 
Main s.holder quota  -9.208*  -13.110**  -0.566  -1.152*  -2.065**  -0.119  -1.054  -1.446**  -1.118*  -1.487 
  (4.755)  (6.076)  (0.533)  (0.622)  (0.987)  (0.614)  (0.694)  (0.601)  (0.627)  (2.534) 
(Main s.holder quota)
2  7.110**  10.100**                 
  (3.435)  (4.392)                 
                     
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                     
Overid. test   0.0046  0.0756  0.9400  0.6462  0.9273  0.8589  0.3910  0.5647  0.5042  0.7202 
(p-value)                     
Observations  12113  12130  5943  6170  5998  520  2468  9645  2954  1124 
Panel B: AGLS 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
   I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD 
       L<34  L³34  Traditional  High Tech  Scale  No scale  Group  Consortium 
Main s.holder quota  -24.426**  -36.358**  -1.636  -2.887*  -6.021**  -0.893  -2.709  -3.874**  -2.872*  -4.103 
   (11.679)  (15.342)  (1.594)  (1.646)  (2.834)  (1.898)  (1.838)  (1.644)  (1.697)  (7.020) 
(Main s.holder quota)
2  11.829**  28.185**                   
   (8.459)  (11.114)                   
                     
T. dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
A. dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                        
Wald test exog.  0.0004  0.0000  0.2308  0.0303  0.0004  0.5898  0.0855  0.0011  0.0466  0.3568 
(p-value)                       
Observations  12113  12130  5943  6169  5995  520  2466  9643  2954  1122 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables are reported at the top of each column. The regressions in Panel A are estimated by 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) and the regressions in Panel B are estimated by two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (AGLS, Newey's minimum chi-squared estimator). We instrument both the main 
shareholder quota and its square. The set of excluded instruments includes: the ratio of local bank branches to national bank branches, savings banks (per 100,000 inahb), in the province in 1936, and 
branches opened by new entrants in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). For the regressions in col. (1) and (2) we have also used total assets, the ratio of current assets to total assets, 
inventories and sales all squared, and the number of bank branches (per 100,000 inhab). For the regressions in col. (3) - (8) we have also used the number of cooperative banks (per 100,000 inhabitants) in 
the province in 1936. Finally, for the regressions in col. (9) - (10) we have used the number of bank branches (per 100,000 inhab) instead of the number of savings banks in the province in 1936. Time 
dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area in the country where the firm is headquartered (Center or South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions in Table 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table also reports the p-values of a Sargan test, as a test of overidentifying restrictions, and of a Wald test, as a test of exogeneity of 
the variables that have been instrumented.  
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Table 8. Shocks to ownership structure and innovation 
Panel A: Product Innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
Main s.holder       0.115  0.001      0.307  0.499 
quota      (0.330)  (0.394)      (0.243)  (0.614) 
                 
Fin. institution   3.302***  9.585***  3.053*  11.232***         
Subscriber  (1.161)  (3.230)  (1.740)  (2.290)         
                 
Intention to           2.593***  7.535*  1.558  6.014* 
go public          (0.662)  (4.098)  (0.985)  (3.325) 
                 
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                 
Overid. test   0.1237    0.0891    0.1370    0.0148   
(p-value)                 
Observations  12662  12662  12045  12045  12314  12314  11723  11723 
Panel B: Process Innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
Main s.holder       0. 512*  1.189      0.562**  1.960*** 
quota      (0.265)  (1.008)      (0.252)  (0.614) 
                 
Fin. institution   3.425***  13.703***  2.039  10.970***         
Subscriber  (1.329)  (3.759)  (1.288)  (4.154)         
                 
Intention to           3.570***  10.856*  1.977*  5.557 
go public          (0.779)  (6.554)  (1.044)  (6.612) 
                 
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                 
Overid. test   0.0593    0.0134    0.3136    0.0503   
(p-value)                 
Observations  12586  12679  12062  12062  12330  12330  11739  11739 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variable of the regressions in Panel A is the dummy for Product Innovation and 
the dependent variable of the regressions in Panel B is the dummy for Process Innovation. The estimation method is reported at the top of each column. We instrument both the main 
shareholder quota and the variables proxying for changes in the ownership structure. The set of instruments includes: number of bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab), 
the ratio of local bank branches to national bank branches, savings banks (per 100,000 inahb), in the province in 1936, branches opened by new incumbents in the province over the 1991-
1998 period, the interaction of these variables with the measure of external financial dependence of Cetorelli and Strahan. In columns (1)-(4), we have also used total assets, the ratio of 
current assets to total assets, inventories and sales all squared. Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area in the country where the firm is headquartered 
(Center or South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions of Table 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table also reports the p-values 
of a Sargan test, as a test of overidentifying restrictions, and of a Wald test, as a test of exogeneity of the variables that have been instrumented.    38 
Table 9. Total investment and innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS 






Main s.holder   -0.502*  -1.406*  0.008  0.066  -0.079  -0.381  0.432 
quota  (0.271)  (0.761)  (0.266)  (0.701)  (0.189)  (0.897)  (0.300) 
               
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
               
Overid. test   0.2715    0.0132    0.2441    0.8397 
(p-value)    0.0266    0.9697       
Wald test ex.            0.7112   
(p-value)               
Observations  12113  12113  12130  12130  12130  12130  9090 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables and the estimation method is 
reported at the top of each column. We instrument Main s.holder quota. The basic set of instruments includes: number of bank branches in the province 
in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab), the ratio of local to national bank branches, number of savings banks in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inahb), 
branches opened by new entrants and branches opened by incumbents in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). We use also the 
interaction of these variables with the measure of external financial dependence of Cetorelli and Strahan. For convenience in col. (1) through (4) we 
report the basic regression results of Table 4 (from col. 2a, 2b, 6a and 6b). Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area 
in the country where the firm is headquartered (Center or South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions in table 2. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table also reports the p-values of a Sargan test, as a test of overidentifying restrictions, and of a 
Wald test, as a test of exogeneity. 
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Table 10. Disentangling the link ownership-innovation. The role of agency problems  
Panel A: Product Innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
Main s.holder quota      -1.500*  -4.225*      -1.080**  0.715 
      (0.770)  (2.466)      (0.428)  (0.776) 
External Manager  0.629***  1.784***  1.679***  4.810**         
  (0.179)  (0.567)  (0.599)  (2.039)         
Main s.holder has           1.217*  3.565**  0.493  4.401*** 
control          (0.693)  (1.420)  (0.894)  (1.456) 
                                 
Time dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Overid. test (p-value)  0.1623    0.9487    0.0000    0.9928   
                 
Wald test  (p. value)    0.0010    0.0000         
                 
Observations  2611  2611  2483  2476  12742  12742  12113  12113 
Panel B: Process Innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  AGLS  2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
2SLS  “Augmented” 
Model 
Main s.holder quota      -0.353  -1.030      -0.222  2.977*** 
      (0.540)  (1.586)      (0.407)  (1.144) 
External Manager  0.771***  2.177***  1.002**  2.857**         
  (0.170)  (0.584)  (0.418)  (1.309)         
Main s.holder has           -0.585  -1.360  -0.862  1.321 
control          (0.585)  (1.447)  (0.854)  (2.065) 
                 
                 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Time dummies 
Area dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                 
Overid. test (p-value)  0.0567    0.1082    0.0184    0.0125   
                 
Wald test  (p. value)    0.0019    0.0130         
                 
Observations  2617  2617  2489  2489  12759  12759  12130  12130 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses).  The estimation method is reported at the top of each column. The dependent variable in the regressions in 
Panel A is Product Innovation. The dependent variable in the regressions in Panel B is Process Innovation. We instrument all the variables whose coefficients are reported in the table. The basic set of 
instruments includes: number of bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab), the ratio of local to national bank branches, number of cooperative banks (per 100,000 inhab.), number of 
savings banks in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab.), branches opened by new entrants and by incumbents in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). For the regressions in col. 
(1)-(4) we add also as instruments: total assets, the ratio of current assets to total assets, inventories and sales all squared. Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area in 
the country where the firm is headquartered. “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions in table 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table also reports 
the p-values of a Sargan test, as a test of overidentifying restrictions, and of a Wald test, as a test of exogeneity.   40 
Table 11. Disentangling the link ownership-innovation. Risk and (lack of) diversification 
Panel A: 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROD  I.PROC  R&D  INFO TECH  PATENTS  INNO INV.  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROD  I.PROC 
Main s.holder quota  -0.442  -0.169  -1.126***  -0.253  -1.022**  -0.296  0.222**  -2.521      -1.031**  0.014 
  (0.466)  (0.429)  (0.396)  (0.338)  (0.417)  (0.266)  (0.103)  (1.768)      (0.431)  (0.447) 
Main s.holder quota *   -0.438***  -0.220***                     
Financ. Concentration  (0.083)  (0.074)                     
                         
Main s.holder quota *       -0.053**  -0.027                 
Ateco 5 digit      (0.026)  (0.022)                 
Corporation                  1.087*  0.979  0.493  1.530* 
                  (0.628)  (0.644)  (0.879)  (0.927) 
                         
Time and Area dum.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                         
Over. test (p-value)  0.1072  0.4663  0.9737  0.0109  0.8425  0.6923  0.9306  0.8263  0.1971  0.0322  0.9913  0.0353 
Observations  4332  4337  12113  12130  12112  10584  12094  2895  12742  12759  12113  12130 
Panel B: AGLS or “Augmented” Model 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 








   I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROD  I.PROC  R&D  INFO TECH  PATENTS    I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROD  I.PROC 
Main s.holder quota  -1.119  -0.346  -3.007***  -0.611  -2.784**  -1.018  5.791**        -0.114  2.591** 
  (1.231)  (1.126)  (1.085)  (0.881)  (1.130)  (0.888)  (2.711)        (0.686)  (1.017) 
Main s.holder quota *   -1.152***  -0.554***                     
Financ. Concentration  (0.227)  (0.210)                     
                         
Main s.holder quota *       -0.148**  -0.071                 
Ateco 5 digit      (0.071)  (0.058)                 
Corporation                  3.205**  2.668*  4.691***  5.781*** 
                  (1.392)  (1.635)  (1.179)  (1.634) 
                         
Time and Area dum.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y 
                         
Wald test  (p. value)  0.0057  0.4447  0.0013  0.4336  0.0015  0.2190  0.0207           
Observations  4332  4337  12113  12130  12109  10582  12055    12742  12759  12113  12130 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables are reported at the top of each column. The regressions in Panel A are estimated by 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) and the regressions in Panel B are estimated by two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (AGLS, Newey's minimum chi-squared estimator) or “Augmented” Model. We 
instrument all the variables whose coefficients are reported in the table. The basic set of instruments includes: number of bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhab.), the ratio of local to 
national bank branches, number of cooperative banks (per 100,000 inhab.) in the province in 1936, branches opened by new entrants in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). For the 
regressions in col. (1) - (4) we also use the interaction of the basic instruments with the index that we use for diversification. In col. (5) and (7) we add as instruments the measure of external financial 
dependence of Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), and the interaction between this measure and the other instruments. For the regressions in col. (9) - (12) we use also the number of savings banks in the province 
in 1936 (per 100,000 inahb) and the number of branches opened by incumbent banks in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area 
dummies refer to the area in the country where the firm is headquartered (Center of South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions in Table 2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. The table also reports the p-values of a Sargan test, as a test of overidentifying restrictions, and of a Wald test, as a test of exogeneity. 
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Table 12. The owner type and innovation 
Panel A: 2SLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC 
Main s.holder quota    -0.708**  -1.700      -0.700**  -1.880**    0.074  -3.383**    -0.226  -1.306 
    (0.319)  (1.454)      (0.334)  (0.860)    (0.272)  (1.728)    (0.335)  (0.942) 
Family  0.708***  0.439*  -0.463  0.598***        -0.082  -0.018  -3.169**       
  (0.245)  (0.253)  (1.322)  (0.217)        (0.216)  (0.220)  (1.571)       
Fam.*Main      1.252              4.367**       
s.holder quota      (1.794)              (2.120)       
Financial institution          -0.532  -0.211  -6.043*        0.945*  0.767  -5.499 
          (0.495)  (0.547)  (3.408)        (0.541)  (0.548)  (3.730) 
Fin. institution *              8.261*            8.932* 
Main s.holder quota              (4.678)            (5.136) 
                           
Financial awareness 
instrument 
N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Time and area dum.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Over. test (p-value)  0.5278  0.8396  0.8260  0.4679  0.0159  0.1190  0.9683  0.0008  0.0002  0.2267  0.0052  0.0004  0.4020 
Observations  12505  11876  11876  12505  12742  12113  12113  12522  11893  11893  12759  12130  12130 
Panel B: ‘Augmented’ Model 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
   I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROD  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC  I.PROC 
Main s.holder quota    -1.320  -6.032*      -1.813**  -4.756***    0.403  -9.532*    0.082  -3.067** 
    (0.898)  (3.689)      (0.853)  (1.535)    (0.853)  (5.493)    (0.853)  (1.355) 
Family  2.064***  -0.662*  5.915  1.755***        -0.144  -1.662***  -10.480**       
  (0.501)  (0.411)  (4.158)  (0.519)        (0.456)  (0.526)  (4.767)       
Fam.*Main      -4.828*              12.483*       
s.holder quota      (3.003)              (6.627)       
Financial institution           -1.664  2.635***  -11.995**        2.276**  3.827***  -11.761** 
          (1.230)  (0.662)  (5.847)        (1.071)  (0.777)  (5.880) 
Fin. institution *              21.170***            22.578*** 
Main s.holder quota              (7.286)            (7.551) 
                           
Financial awareness 
instrument 
N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Time and area dum.  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
+ controls  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                           
Observations  12505  11876  11876  12505  12742  12113  12113  12522  11893  11893  12759  12130  12130 
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables are reported at the top of each column. The regressions in Panel A are estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 
regressions in Panel B are estimated by the “Augmented” model. We instrument all the variables whose coefficients are reported in the table. The set of instruments includes: the number of bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 
inhab.), the ratio of local bank branches to national bank branches, cooperative banks (per 100,000 inhab.), savings banks (per 100,000 inahb), in the province in 1936, branches opened by new entrants and branches opened by incumbent 
banks in the province over the 1991-1998 period (net of closures). Moreover, we also use the square of these variables. Finally, in column (4), as a robustness check, we also add as instrument a measure of financial awareness similar to that in 
Guiso and Jappelli (2005). Time dummies denote the year of the survey. Area dummies refer to the area in the country where the firm is headquartered (Center or South). “+ controls” denotes the RHS variables of the regressions in Table 2. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table also reports the p-values of a Sargan test, as a test of overidentifying restrictions. 
  
 